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The Shape of Things

PERHAPS THE LENGTH OF THE PACIFIC WAR and the future balance of power in Asia were decided at last week's conference between Premier T. V. Soong and Premier Stalin. Chungking reports the possibility that Russia may resume military assistance to China on an even larger scale than that furnished prior to the Russo-German war. In return, China might grant Russia a warm-water naval base in the Liaotung Peninsula and transit rights across Manchuria such as it possessed before the Japanese invasion in 1931. (The Outer Mongolian Premier was in Moscow at the time of the Soong-Stalin talks; it may be that actual military intervention is not far off.) The achievement of a basic Soviet-Chinese agreement would almost certainly have a profound effect on the internal political conflict in China, and there are indications that new moves to bring about a truce between Chungking and Yenan have already been made. Chou En-lai, the Communist envoy, is back in Chungking after several months' absence from the capital. Even more important is the visit to Yenan of seven non-Kuomintang liberals headed by Hwang Yen-pao. This group may be planning to bring about a settlement or to line up a united opposition against Chiang; either course of action might break the deadlock. The United States should take advantage of the new situation to return to the Gauss-Stilwell policy and join with Russia in bringing pressure on both Yenan and Chungking to solve their long dispute.

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THE IMPASSE OVER BERLIN'S ADMINISTRATION was inherent in a policy that divided into three zones, under Russian, British, and American jurisdiction, a desolated island of broken masonry miles inside the boundaries of the Russian occupation area. The food and fuel situation is critical in the American and British zones, the Red Army is apparently reluctant to withdraw from these areas, and the clash between the occupation policies of the Russians and the Western Allies is causing confusion. Without being too didactic on the basis of limited information, it does seem logical that Berlin's affairs must be placed under a single authority, whether it be a joint Allied administration or solely Russian. If Berlin has such symbolical significance as the former German capital that the Allied Control Council must be located there, then the Council should have no direct concern with municipal administration. It might be worth considering a border city, say at the point of contact of the three main zones of occupation, as the seat for the Control Council. In that event, Berlin might well be left to Russian administration. The present Berlin arrangement seems utter

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nonsense and an unnecessary source of interminable trouble. What is important is to get this minor disagreement cleared out of the way as soon as possible. The Big Three meeting has matters of vastly greater proportions to wrestle with.

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AS A POSTSCRIPT TO MR. DOWNES'S ARTICLE ON page 37 we print without comment the following item from *La Voce* in Naples:

> PALERMO, June 11.—Yesterday a commemoration of Giacomo Matteotti was scheduled to take place at the Garibaldi Theater. The theater had been put at the disposal of the Socialist Party. But at 10:30, when the ceremony was to start and the public was filing into the theater, an Allied officer came to warn that the commemoration had to be non-political in character. . . . The Socialist Party preferred not to commemorate Giacomo Matteotti. . . .

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RECOGNITION OF THE NEW POLISH UNITY Government by the United States and Britain is a good augury for the forthcoming Big Three meeting in Berlin. It is one step at least to the resettlement of Europe which is so urgently needed. But the problem of Poland cannot be regarded as completely solved; until the promised elections are held, which may not be for many months, we must fear the mischief-making propensities of the London die-hards who, although disbanded as a government, will no doubt attempt to continue their anti-Soviet propaganda in America and Britain. It ought to be made very clear to them that they can expect no official facilities, such as they have hitherto enjoyed, and a sharp watch should be kept to see that they do not abuse the hospitality of the countries in which they are refugees. The British government has, quite properly, promised not to send back to Poland exiles who are unwilling to return. But provision ought also to be made to insure that those who wish to go home are not deterred from doing so by any kind of intimidation. This is particularly necessary in the case of the 250,000 men in the Polish army in exile. Most of the officers appear to be anti-Soviet zealots and under these circumstances dissent in the rank and file is apt to be dangerous. Since this Polish army is under the command of the British, the latter should make certain that every man is given a free choice between acceptance of British citizenship or an honorable discharge and repatriation to his native land. Nor would it be politic to maintain as a unit those whose option is to stay in the West. That would be as challenging to Russia as the organization of a Soviet army of Indian exiles would be to Britain.

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WHATEVER SATISFACTION WAS FELT OVER THE admission of Argentina to the new international organization did not last very long. The decision, pictured by the press and by columnists close to the Administration as a victory, has turned out to be what it actually was from the start—an unnecessary and shameful defeat. Even Señor Ezequiel Padilla, Mexico's Foreign Minister, who in San Francisco used all his considerable eloquence to force the immediate admission of Argentina, admitted in Washington last Wednesday that "the Argentine government had not lived up to the expectations of the countries which, in the interest of inter-American solidarity," had favored its admission to the United Nations organization. Señor Padilla was obliged to make this public admission before leaving for Mexico in order to temper the growing opposition that his attitude in San Francisco has aroused at home. Describing the widespread dissatisfaction that has arisen in Mexico over this departure from the uncompromising democratic foreign policy of the past ten years, Señor Narciso Bassols, Mexican ambassador to Moscow, who is on his way back to the Soviet Union after a brief visit to Mexico, published a devastating attack on Foreign Minister Padilla. The fact that the "rebel" ambassador was sent back to Moscow after an audience with President Avila Camacho seems to indicate that Señor Padilla, in taking the position he did in San Francisco, found his chief encouragement in that "dear Ezequiel" with which he was distinguished by "dear Ed" Stettinius. Both tasted an hour of victory at San Francisco, but the people of the United States will join with the people of Mexico in repudiating such frivolity in foreign affairs.

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LAST WEEK'S RETIREMENT OF HARRY HOPKINS, more than any other of the recent Washington exits, may be taken as the final curtain on the New Deal drama. Whatever may be produced under President Truman's direction will be a new play, new authorship. Harry Hopkins will always be thought of within the Roosevelt shadow; many will think of him as the Roosevelt shadow. In the springtime of the New Deal, Hopkins was one of F. D. R.'s bright young liberals; in its sere and yellow, when big business was swarming all over Capitol Hill, Hopkins played a go-between role in that strange coalition of self-confident right and palsied left. His useful career might well have ended about the time of the war's outbreak. But it was at that very moment that Hopkins, a worn-out, sick man, grasped the opportunity to demonstrate his remarkable capacity in the field of international relations. First as Lend-Lease Administrator, then as confidential adviser and personal errand boy of the President, he played a part in forging the Allied coalition the importance of which it is impossible to overestimate. He acquired new stature and new authority. Those who watched him in conference after conference, meeting after meeting, say that his spectacular mission to Moscow, which may have saved the San Francisco conference, was but the last of numerous decisive actions which broke apparently insoluble deadlocks. *The Nation* salutes Harry Hopkins for his devotion, his ability, and his courage.

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THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, WITH THE approval of the President, granted on July 5 transatlantic flying charters to three companies—Pan American Airways, American Export Airlines (henceforth to be controlled by American Airlines), and Transcontinental and Western Airlines. Next day, the Senate Commerce Committee turned down by a narrow margin Senator McCarran's cherished bill providing for the establishment of a single American "Flagline" to operate all transoceanic traffic. An effort may be made to reverse this decision on the floor, but it seems

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safe to assert that Pan American has lost its long battle to secure a monopoly of the international skies. Before the war it had become "a chosen instrument" by virtue of its skill in lobbying as well as by its pioneering efforts. During the war, however, the domestic airlines nosed their way into the business as contractors for the Army Air Transport Service. In a new attempt to head them off, Pan American and its chief protagonist in Congress, Senator McCarran, put forward a plan for an all-American line in which the domestic operators would be permitted to invest. Pan American would, of course, have provided the nucleus for the new company and would have retained effective control. This proposal failed to satisfy the ambitions of the domestic companies, which united to press their claims for a share of the international routes and proceeded to give Pan American a lesson in publicity and pressure tactics—no easy task. The C. A. B. decision crowns their efforts, and competitive development is now assured. But while, under the Civil Aeronautics Act, competition between American air companies is controlled, there is no corresponding international body to regulate relations between the airlines of different nations. This question was sidetracked at the Chicago Conference last year, but it is bound to arise again if only because of the danger that competition for traffic on the basis of efficiency can so easily degenerate into competition for subsidies.

Our Policy Toward Japan

NO ONE knows when the war with Japan will end. It is conceivable that the Japanese will fight in Asia and in their homeland as they did on Okinawa and Iwo Jima. But it is also possible, as Lieut. General Holland M. Smith recently predicted, that the Japanese industrialists will try to stop the war before their cities are completely razed by American planes. In that event we may expect peace feelers in a matter of months, if not weeks. When they come, it is imperative that our responsible officials be ready with a program that will make a resurgence of Japanese militarism impossible.

Because the State Department under the leadership of Grew and Dooman has seemed disposed to deal only with the external manifestations of Japanese militarism, *The Nation* is devoting much of its space this week to an analysis of the Japanese problem. Laurence E. Salisbury, who served as a foreign-service officer in Japan and other parts of Asia for many years, describes the decisive role of the *Zaibatsu,* or big-business group, in the development of Japan's aggressive policies. Our Washington correspondent, I. F. Stone, has analyzed Mr. Grew's own account of his ambassadorship to Tokyo, showing how consistently he misjudged the situation in the months prior to Pearl Harbor and how naively he clung to his illusions about the good intentions of the Emperor and the Japanese liberals (*sic*). Finally, T. A. Bisson contrasts the State Department's limited program with the kind of policy that is needed to destroy the roots of Japanese militarism.

The State Department's program for a "soft" peace for Japan contrasts sharply with the firmness displayed toward Germany in the seizure of the I. G. Farben plants. Most Americans, conservatives as well as liberals, have come to realize that the Krupps and the Thyssens are basically as responsible for German militarism as the General Staff. But we have failed to realize that in Japan we have an even more pronounced concentration of economic power and an equally strong affiliation between the monopolists and the military. The public can hardly be blamed for its lack of understanding of the situation in view of the complexity of Japanese society and the dearth of reliable information. But the State Department cannot be let off on any such excuse. For years we have maintained a fairly large number of diplomatic representatives in Japan whose duty it has been to understand Japanese society. That the attack on Pearl Harbor came as a great "surprise" reveals the inadequacy of the top officials assigned to that duty. It will indeed be tragic if we permit the same State Department clique that is responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor to shape our post-war policies toward Japan.

Cabinet Changes

WITH the appointment of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State and the replacement of Henry Morgenthau by Fred M. Vinson, President Truman's remaking of his Cabinet is nearing completion. Only four Roosevelt appointees now remain—Messrs. Ickes, Stimson, Forrestal, and Wallace. Mr. Ickes has been the subject of many rumors, but if he is scheduled for the ax, it is not to fall yet. Immediately he is to head a mission to London to negotiate an agreement with the British on Middle Eastern oil. Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal may stay on for a while also, and there seems no doubt that Henry Wallace will remain undisturbed at the Department of Commerce. Mr. Truman has shown himself skilful in balancing the diverse forces which make up his support, and the presence of one 100 per cent liberal in his official family is essential to satisfy the progressive forces.

As a whole the reconstructed Cabinet has a middle-of-the-road complexion. The selection of Mr. Byrnes did give it a conservative twist, but the President has done something to restore equilibrium by naming Mr. Vinson, who combines political "know-how" with a progressive outlook. Treasury and State are not only the senior departments but are central in policy-making. That is why, while recognizing the merits of Mr. Byrnes, we greet his appointment without enthusiasm. He has some of the qualities required for the job. His friends say he is a good administrator, and Heaven knows one is needed to clean the Augean stables of State and reorganize it for its enormously expanded post-war tasks. He is undoubtedly a shrewd negotiator who will deal firmly but diplomatically with foreign statesmen, and his understanding of Congress will prove very helpful in gaining approval for new treaties.

But even more important than these qualifications is the

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ability to conceive and carry through broad policies, and in this respect Mr. Byrnes is something of an unknown quantity. He backed Mr. Roosevelt strongly in the difficult days of the neutrality debates and the lend-lease bill; he certainly favors full American participation in the organization of world peace; he will presumably work hard for the removal of trade barriers. That is to say, he will carry on the Hull tradition, but it seems improbable that he will lift his vision beyond Mr. Hull's rather limited sights, or show any broader understanding of the emerging political and social forces in Europe and Asia on which we must build if the world is to be reconstructed peacefully.

It is not minimizing the importance of the Department of State to say it may be even more vital that the policy-making functions of the Treasury devolve on a strong and imaginative personality. For that department holds the key not only to prosperity but to world peace. The United States looms so large in the world economy, its proportionate share of production is so huge, that depression here is bound to be communicated to all other nations. As Representative George E. Outland of California told the House in urging action on the Murray bill, we cannot carry out the commitments entered into at San Francisco unless we eliminate in America the cycle of boom and bust. He went on:

> With full employment, we can be good neighbors; with unemployment, we can neither be friendly and cooperative with other nations, nor can we here in our own country be decent, fair, and democratic toward each other. Just as among ourselves, depression produces fear, discrimination, hate, and division among classes, groups, races, colors, sexes, and ages, so world depression leads down the same road to war.

Whether the Murray bill or some similar measure is enacted or not, the fiscal policies of the federal government will to a large extent determine levels of production and employment. Conservative estimates of the post-war budget place it at between $25 and $30 billion against little more than $8 billion in 1937. The manner in which this sum is raised and spent will be a major influence on the national economy as a whole. We can rejoice, therefore, that the President has ignored advice to appoint a man like Senator George, to whom a balanced budget appears the chief end of public finance.

Mr. Vinson some months ago indorsed the Murray Bill, and in a recent quarterly report as Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion he set forth a well-considered program for a rising post-war standard of living. To reach and maintain full employment, he declared, the fiscal system must be completely overhauled and taxes must be levied so that they neither hinder investment nor destroy mass markets. He advocated, therefore, a broad-based, progressive income tax as the backbone of the revenue system and the paring of regressive sales and excise taxes to a minimum. Other points in his program included stronger anti-monopoly measures, the broadening of social security, and the planning of long-term public works. Mr. Vinson, who is popular with Congress, should enjoy better success in putting over such ideas than Mr. Morgenthau, who upheld liberal standards courageously but was constantly frustrated on Capitol Hill.

Agenda for Berlin

ALL PREVIOUS meetings of the three greatest Allied powers have been devoted primarily to planning destruction. This time, with Hitler's Reich lying in rubble around their feet, they meet to agree on joint plans of construction. Together Russia and Britain and the United States face the staggering job of putting Europe and the Mediterranean world together again. No single meeting can do more than agree on objectives and the first steps to be taken toward them. But at least we have a right to demand a clear enough understanding among the Big Three so that those first steps will be headed in the same direction, so that purposes will not cross and create new conflicts. And we have a right to expect a few basic political-economic decisions.

1. Economic help for Europe. This should be the first item of business. For the solution of all other problems, political or territorial, depends upon the restoration of the continental economy. We have written a charter to preserve the peace, but we shall have no peace if Europe falls into a chaos of industrial collapse; if the people freeze and go hungry.

The situation of France can be taken as an epitome of the whole problem. Today the shortage of coal, the destruction of communications, and the lack, particularly, of rolling stock and motor trucks have brought French production to a standstill. In a recent issue, *Business Week,* reporting on the deepening economic crisis in Europe, said that of the normal imports of the western European countries only 5 or 10 per cent is now arriving, while the losses suffered by each country prevent recovery without help from outside. "France, for example, has only 6,000 locomotives out of a pre-war total of 16,000. In 1939 the French had 450,000 freight cars. Now, even with the slow return of rolling stock from Germany, they have only 200,000. Before the war, there were 500,000 motor trucks in France. Today only about 125,000 are usable." A nine-power emergency food conference is about to meet in London and British experts have just completed a study of France's internal production problems in time for the meeting. As a striking example of the shortages and their causes, beet-sugar production, normally 900,000 tons a year, was cut in 1944-45 to 600,000, but "because it required 500,000 tons of coal to transport the crop and handle the refining, and because the coal was not available, barely 300,000 tons of sugar were produced." It is the same for every basic necessity.

The three great powers must agree on methods of overcoming the crisis. Russia itself is desperately in need of the tools of industrial production, but it controls great food-, oil-, and coal-producing areas. These products it should be willing to share, on a planned basis, with the countries of the West. But the major part of the job of restocking must be undertaken by Britain and the United States. They control the bulk of the world's ocean shipping, and have the largest potential supplies of machinery. Even though one cannot expect agreement today as to basic methods and objectives between Russia and the West, a common policy for providing the necessities of European survival should be possible.

2. A coordinated policy for Germany. This will be even harder to achieve. Already the occupying powers are using different methods and consolidating their positions in their

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own spheres. Russian methods are positive and aggressive; those of the Western powers negative, related to immediate problems of security and order rather than to long-range plans of development. Russia is interested in making Germany self-supporting; the Western authorities so far have left their areas economically stagnant. Russia is promoting political activity among the anti-Nazi elements; the Western authorities are suppressing such activity, as the article by Philip Jordan in this issue so clearly shows.

Again it may be that no common basic policy can be arrived at; certainly the Western Allies show little inclination for a more positive program for Germany. But at least we must have agreement as to such immediate problems as the kind and number of industrial establishments which are to be put into production; the use to be made of the products of German industries; the feeding of the country and the sources from which the necessary minimum of food is to come; the treatment of Nazis in and out of office; the disposition of the demobilized German army. The question of reparations must be jointly solved. And without too much delay, the new boundaries of the conquered country must be determined.

All of these items properly belong on the agenda of the meeting in Berlin, but not all can be finally disposed of there. For it would be improper, and indeed futile, to settle such questions as frontiers and reparations without consulting France, one of the occupying powers and the one most directly affected. The absence of France from the Berlin conference is a great misfortune from every point of view.

3. Palestine. It is inevitable that the disposition of the homeless millions in Europe—the armies of "displaced persons"—will come before the Berlin conference. It is a part of every other problem, economic and political. Related to it, but related also to the unstable situation in the Middle East, is the issue of Palestine. No longer can military necessity be dragged out as an excuse for the inexcusable. Winston Churchill himself has used as strong language as any Zionist in denouncing the betrayal perpetrated in the White Paper, and it is certain that the Jewish people of Palestine will no longer tolerate the restrictions. Palestine is an international question and it should be dealt with as such; Britain itself should be the first to welcome a joint move for its solution. Such a move should certainly be initiated by the United States. Mr. Truman has just been urged by thirty-seven state governors, meeting at Mackinac Island, to take up the question at Berlin. The Palestine issue was cold-shouldered at San Francisco, but it will not be settled until the Balfour Declaration is again recognized as a binding obligation by the British government.

4. Spain. Certainly the Spanish issue should appear on the agenda at Berlin. Since the San Francisco conference barred Franco from the over-hospitable ranks of the new security organization, it is more than ever absurd that Britain and the United States should carry on the farce of dealing with that tottering fascist relic. Only last week *Pravda* revealed in detail the extent to which, now as before the defeat of Hitler, Spain is the safe refuge for German capital and German business men. If Mr. Truman fails to bring up the question of Spain at Berlin we hope Stalin will do so. But it would be far better if this piece of unfinished business were laid before the meeting by the American government. The Friends of the Spanish Republic, supported by a large group of liberal organizations, has wired to Mr. Truman an urgent request that the Berlin conference be used as the occasion for joint action on Spain by the three big powers.

Pearl Harbor Diplomats

BY I. F. STONE

IN THE fall of 1941 Joseph Clark Grew had been our ambassador in Japan for almost ten years. His second-in-command, the counselor of the American embassy in Tokyo, Eugene H. Dooman, was born in Japan, had entered the foreign service there in 1912, and had lived in Japan most of his life. Both were proud of their friendly relations with the highest circles of Japanese society. Dooman is one of the few Americans who read and speak Japanese with fluency. It was on these two officials that the American government was dependent for accurate information and appraisal of political developments in Japan.

Our main source of information on the views they transmitted to Washington is Grew's "Ten Years in Japan," a carefully edited selection from his diaries and reports. Grew can boast of two warnings to the American government. "There is a lot of talk around town," he noted in his diary on January 27, 1941, "to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course I informed our government." Grew does not seem to have taken this report seriously, for there is no further reference to it. But he did send home a grave warning in a report to the department on November 3, 1941. This report supplemented a previous report on September 29, 1941. It is odd that, unlike all the other diary entries and reports in Grew's books, these two documents are not provided in their original text. They are marked "(Substance)" and "(Paraphrase of original text prepared by Department of State)." The paraphrase says the Ambassador reported that "action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."

These two isolated warnings must be read in context. The complete record may never become public, but even in "Ten Years in Japan," which Dooman helped Grew to edit, the evidence is unmistakable: in the fateful autumn of 1941 Grew and Dooman completely misread events. They were guilty of wishful thinking not only about the Emperor and their aristocratic friends but also about Konoye and Tojo, and this wishful thinking continued even after Pearl Harbor.

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Their attitude of mind must bear its share of the responsibility for Japan's successful stab-in-the-back attack. And it needs to be recalled and analyzed because, unlike Kimmel and Short, Grew and Dooman were rewarded with new posts of influence and honor: Grew as head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department and then as Under Secretary, and Dooman as the department's leading adviser on Far Eastern affairs. Both men are likely to play major roles in shaping our post-war policy toward Japan. The talk in Washington is that while Grew may be removed as Under Secretary, he will be sent to the Far East as political adviser to MacArthur. His position, like his fundamental political outlook, would be comparable to that of Robert Murphy, political adviser to Eisenhower. Grew would almost certainly be accompanied by Dooman, whom Grew in "Ten Years in Japan" calls "my *fidus Achates*." The implied comparison is unfair to the friend and armor-bearer of Aeneas.

Grew's reports were prepared with the help of Dooman, a far abler man than his chief. In the preface to "Ten Years in Japan" Grew says he "counted greatly in the formulation through those years of the views herein set forth" on Dooman's "long experience in Japan, mature advice, and incisive diagnosis of political developments."

One is inclined to suspect from the views set forth in Grew's report to the Secretary of State on September 29, 1941, that this was made public in paraphrase rather than in text to protect Grew. It was a plea for further appeasement of Japan, and it was based on a ridiculous misconception of the character of the Konoye government, which had taken Japan a long way toward fascism and war. Soon after becoming Premier in July, 1940, Konoye abolished the Japanese General Federation of Labor. In September he signed a treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy. In October he set up the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Japan's closest approach to a totalitarian political party. At the end of 1940 he established a Supreme Economic Council. In January, 1941, he launched a ten-year program to expand food production in Manchuria. In April, preparing the way for a southward advance against British, Dutch, and American possessions, Konoye signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union and in June a trade agreement. After Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Konoye moved troops into French Indo-China. In September, when Grew sent his report to the State Department, Konoye was trying to set up control associations for each basic industry, Fascist style.

What conclusions did Grew and Dooman draw from these developments? "The Ambassador," says the State Department paraphrase of the report of September 29, 1941, "recalls his reports to the department to the effect that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived." The Ambassador thought there was "a good chance" of "Japan's falling into line" with the Atlantic Charter. He felt that the "impact of world developments" had "rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds" which might "bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States." The reader who desires to may study this fantastic analysis for himself on page 437 of "Ten Years in Japan."

Grew pleaded with the American government in the negotiations then going on with Japan not to insist on "the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty." He asked instead that we place "a reasonable amount of confidence" in "the good faith of Prince Konoye." He pleaded that if we insisted on "clear-cut commitments" from Japan, the conversations would drag along indefinitely and Konoye would conclude "that the United States government is only playing for time." He warned that "the logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States."

President Roosevelt was less trusting than Grew, and the conversations lagged. In October the Konoye Cabinet fell. On the 18th General Tojo became Prime Minister. It was announced that he would be his own War Minister and, significantly, that he was retaining his active rank in the Japanese armed forces. The Tojo government was in fact a military dictatorship, and events were soon to make it clear that Tojo's accession to power was the signal that war with the United States had been decided upon. Tojo took power just fifty days before Pearl Harbor, and actual fleet and military preparations for the widespread attacks on December 7 must have begun soon after. But Grew and Dooman continued optimistic in their reports, and trustful in their Japanese informants. On the day of Tojo's appointment Grew recorded in his diary that Konoye's private secretary had "conveyed through him to me from Prince Konoye a very interesting explanation of the circumstances which had led to the fall of the Cabinet *and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister to insure the appointment of a successor who would continue the conversations with the United States*" (my italics). Grew himself noted, "Tojo was one of the original five members of the Konoye Cabinet last spring who supported the opening of conversations with the United States in the face of the opposition of Matsuoka. This is important."

On October 20 Grew's optimism has grown. He reported that he had learned from "a confidant of Prince Konoye" that Konoye resigned because he felt the negotiations with the United States "would make more rapid progress if our government were dealing with a Prime Minister whose power was based on . . . the army, which is the controlling force in matters affecting policy." Grew concluded that it would be "premature to stigmatize the Tojo government as a military dictatorship" committed to policies which would "bring about armed conflict with the United States." On the contrary, Grew felt that Tojo, by "retaining his active rank in the army, will as a result be in a position to exercise a larger degree of control over army extremist groups."

Five days later Grew was jubilant. "A reliable Japanese informant" told him that before the fall of the Konoye government the Emperor demanded a guaranty from the army and navy that they would not involve Japan in war with the United States. "The Emperor's definite stand," Grew reported, "necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a position effectively to control the army, hence the appointment of General Tojo." Grew wrote that his

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informant, "who is in contact with the highest circles," told him "that for the first time in ten years the situation at present and the existing political setup in Japan offer a possibility of a reorientation of Japanese policy and action." There is not a line or phrase to indicate that Grew did not accept these statements as fact.

On October 29 Grew reported that the Germans were disappointed because they had hoped for "a definitely interventionist government" when Konoye resigned. Grew said the Germans were "uncertain" of what Japan would do if the United States went to war with the Reich. "The Germans," he wrote, "are at present working primarily for a Japanese attack on the Soviet." This was forty-one days before Pearl Harbor.

This extraordinary series of misjudgments was capped by the November 3 report, the second one which is presented only in State Department paraphrase. In this report, the paraphrase says, "the Ambassador refers to his various telegraphic reports during several months past analyzing the factors affecting policy in Japan and says he has nothing to add thereto nor any substantial revision to make thereof." This would imply that he still felt the moment had arrived when, as he said in the September 29 report quoted above, "liberal elements might come to the top in due course" if we did not insist on clear-cut commitments in our negotiations with the Japanese. It also implies that Grew did not think the formation of the Tojo government had brought about any fundamental change in the situation.

It is in this report, as part of a plea against economic sanctions and for "constructive conciliation"—a phrase Grew said was preferable to the term "appeasement"—that we come across the warning on which Grew and the State Department pride themselves. In the final paragraph of the paraphrase, we read, "The Ambassador sees no need for much anxiety respecting the bellicose tone and substance at present of the Japanese press." Obviously, then, he did not consider this anti-American propaganda an emotional preparation for war. But, as a final argument for "constructive conciliation," Grew adds that it would be "shortsighted" to think that "Japanese preparations are no more than saber-rattling" and warns that action by Japan "which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." The phrasing is curious. Even a diplomat would hardly say that an attack on American territory "might render unavoidable an armed conflict." Strategically, the Dutch East Indies and Singapore could not be attacked without also attacking the Philippines. I believe that when and if the full facts are known we shall find that Grew still expected Japan to attack the Soviet Union.

One would be inclined to give Grew more credit for the November 3 warning if it were not followed by the same kind of wishful thinking and bad reporting which preceded it. But Grew is as blissfully idiotic about Kurusu as he was about Tojo. On November 4, after the Kurusu mission was announced, Grew noted correctly that Kurusu "was last ambassador in Rome and then in Berlin, and he it was who signed the Tripartite Pact," but he adds, "I have no reason to believe that he is any more friendly to the Nazis than to us." His basis for this conclusion is, "His wife is American, and his daughter, Jaye, was a great friend of Elsie's [Grew's daughter]. We had a long and very frank talk." Nor did Grew see anything other than "childishness" in the fact that even as Kurusu left for Washington the Japanese were continuing "to fill their press with hostile articles which tend to render an understanding impossible."

Grew went on happily whistling in the dark until the end. On November 20 he reports that the Japanese embassy in Berlin was embarrassed by the Kurusu mission "and resents it." Even Tojo's bellicose speech of November 29, in which he celebrated the anniversary of the Anti-Comintern Pact by threatening to "purge" American and British influence from East Asia, did not disturb Grew's cheerfulness. He thought the speech "utterly stupid . . . of course, it was chiefly for domestic consumption." The Japanese, Grew concluded, "are really children and should be treated as children." The day before Pearl Harbor Grew was further cheered by "a Japanese informant of known reliability," who told him that "neither the Prime Minister nor any member of the Cabinet had seen the text of General Tojo's speech . . . in advance." Since Tojo himself was Prime Minister, this is puzzling. But Grew was informed that the speech was "read by proxy, as is often done in Japan," and it was pointed out to him that "the substance and tone" of the speech "was different from all General Tojo's previous addresses." As they say in vaudeville, it must have been two other fellows.

Grew and Dooman were suckers to the end. Even Pearl Harbor did not end their weakness for gold-brick explanations. On December 9 Grew reports another happy discovery. Ohta, of the European section of the Japanese Foreign Office, called at the embassy that day. "Dooman asked Ohta," Grew recorded, "whether the Foreign Minister, in expressing reluctance to stay up very late to receive me, was trying to avoid having to meet me in person again after the beginning of the hostilities. Ohta burst out spontaneously and with considerable feeling. 'Not at all. The Foreign Minister knew nothing about the attack on Hawaii until early the next morning.' " Dooman discussed this with Grew, and Grew concluded, "Without pressing the point too far, it seems clear that His Imperial Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs had no prior knowledge that an act of war was to be committed by the Japanese forces." Unversed as I am in Shinto legend, I doubt whether it contains any instances of more touching faith in the Emperor and his officials.

Grew's past record and diaries, James R. Young's "Behind the Rising Sun," and talks with Americans who have served in Japan leave the impression that the Back Bay Bostonian, Grew, and Dooman, the son of poor Persian immigrants to Japan, are snobs and social climbers who were thrilled by the Imperial Court and aristocratic Japanese society. Their judgment was affected by their social contacts to the point of fatuity, and their eager gullibility was skilfully played upon by the Japanese for their own ends. They became pipe lines for misinformation intended to lull the United States into a false sense of security while Japan expanded in East Asia, and they cannot be trusted for realistic or rigorous advice as to the future of Japan. The Japanese, seeing the high positions Grew and Dooman still occupy in our government, must chuckle over an observation Grew confided to his diary in November, 1941. "The naivete of the Japanese," Grew observed, "is really amazing."

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What Program for Japan?

BY T. A. BISSON

IN these summer months of 1945 the bases required for the final offensives of the Pacific War are being won and consolidated. No one can doubt that the military defeat of Japan is now only a matter of time. It will come suddenly, as the result of a surrender by the so-called "moderates" who today control the Japanese government, or more slowly, after Japan has been racked by a suicidal last-ditch defense. But whatever form it takes, the military end can already be foreseen.

These facts mean that the first task imposed by Pearl Harbor is being successfully accomplished. We are witnessing the eclipse of that vision of a "Greater East Asia" for which Japan's oligarchy precipitated a devastating conflict. The second, more basic, task is still to be done. The Japanese oligarchy responsible for this war, and capable of preparing another, has yet to be uprooted. This objective can be whittled down only at grave peril to the future. Unless it is completely attained, there will be no certainty that the war against Japan has been finally won.

The very dimensions of the victory now unfolding will make it fatally easy to become complacent, to consent to policies inadequate to cope with dimly seen future dangers. In coming months the terms of peace to be meted out to Japan should be a major concern of the American people, who are paying the full price of the victory: there is far too much evidence that their interests are not being fully protected in the official "peace" program. Their intervention is needed to assure a peace that will be as conclusive as the military victory.

What are the yardsticks of a settlement with Japan that may be accepted as adequate, as holding out the promise of being permanent? The most fundamental criterion is not a difficult one to grasp, nor one to which Americans conscious of their heritage should take exception. It is that conditions be established which will enable the Japanese people, all of them, to participate in the choice of a government responsive to their needs. By definition, therefore, the narrow oligarchy that has dominated Japan under the 1889 constitution must be driven from power.

At this point the State Department's policy makers, to the extent that they express themselves, immediately begin to throw up a smoke screen. The only Japanese to whom they are opposed, it would seem, are the "militarists." All other aspects of the Japanese state are so "peculiar" that one must beware of interfering with them. The area of "peculiarity" is an extensive one. It embraces the Emperor, the professional bureaucracy, and, even more important, the handful of big business men and monopolists *(Zaibatsu)* who have waxed fat on the four major wars fought by Japan since 1894. It also covers the landlords and the Diet politicians who have flocked into Japan's "totalitarian" parties since 1940.

These groups, however, along with the "militarists," make up the oligarchy that has controlled Japan for two generations. Merely to eliminate the "militarists" is not an adequate peace program for Japan, any more than it is for Germany. The German monopolists, the Junker landlords, and the Prussian bureaucracy proved able to prepare Germany for a new war in twenty-one years. Their brothers in Japan, left with the Emperor to head a continuing regime "of the few, by the few, and for the few," will not rest until they have repeated Germany's feat. The world security organization will be faced with the permanent and, quite probably, futile task of restraining the Japanese oligarchs.

Why not lighten this task by fostering democracy in post-war Japan? After the sacrifices we have made to defeat the oligarchy in war, there is no reason for the State Department to put it back in power. And there is every reason for the State Department to support a democratic program which answers to the true interests of the American people. Such a program would include the following points: (1) elimination of the Emperor system and the intrenched bureaucracy, modeled on that of Prussia; (2) abolition of the baldly authoritarian constitution of 1889, the "gift" of the Emperor; (3) drafting of a new constitution by a convention of freely elected representatives, one that will rest on the will of the people; (4) destruction of the *Zaibatsu's* armament factories and nationalization of all large peace-time industrial plants; (5) drastic agrarian reforms, designed to end the landlords' rack-renting of millions of tenant farmers.

Confronted with a fully democratic program of this sort, the State Department and its apologists raise another smoke screen. Who are we, they say, to decide such things for the Japanese people? Are we able to "impose" these terms without bringing on "even worse" after-effects? Is there any real popular support in Japan for such changes? The concern manifested here for the Japanese people is touching but thoroughly hypocritical. What Grew, Dooman, and their followers are really concerned about is something quite different. They fear a popular revolt which will topple the "moderates"—Emperor, *Zaibatsu,* landlords, and the rest—who, they hope, will retain power in post-war Japan.

This smoke screen conveniently ignores the fact that we do not have to "impose" anything directly save thoroughgoing demilitarization and effective punishment of the leading war criminals. For our basic policy the essential requirement is quite simple: *that we support the formation of a post-war government by leaders of the movements that will be in revolt against the oligarchy.* This is the essence of a genuinely constructive policy, on which everything else turns. It demands a choice; evasion is possible for a time, but ultimately the choice must be made. The American people have a right to ask: Where is a policy statement by any responsible State Department official which makes the democratic choice the basis of our post-war program toward Japan?

The burden of proof certainly rests upon the State Department. If a constructive and democratically based program is under preparation, there is not a scintilla of evidence to indi-

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cate it. Evidence that the department is seeking to have the old regime retain power, on the other hand, is voluminous, despite a careful effort during the past year to conceal from the American public the baldest aspects of this program.

On the Emperor issue, a touchstone in all post-war plans for Japan, Grew's own record is quite open and forthright, much more so than the department's position on most other aspects of our Japanese policy. In public addresses he has absolved Hirohito of war guilt by asserting that he labored "earnestly but futilely to control the military in order to avoid war." What is more significant, Grew has publicly favored maintenance of the Emperor institution. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December, 1944, he set against the "stabilizing force" which the Emperor might exert, the dread specter of our having to "control a disintegrating community of over 70,000,000 people." The juxtaposition of ideas is an unwitting disclosure of the fear that the oligarchy might collapse in the face of popular revolt if the Emperor's "stabilizing" influence were removed. Wilfred Fleisher, whose book "What to Do with Japan" follows the State Department line, makes the same point rather more bluntly. He writes: "The Emperor, whoever he may be, can serve us after Japan's defeat. It may be assumed that at the time of Japan's surrender there will be chaos in the country, and the first duty of an army of occupation will therefore be to restore order. The Emperor would provide a rallying-point and become a stabilizing factor."

After the Emperor come the *Zaibatsu*—the monopolists on whom the State Department would rely in the post-war era, despite their close ties with the "militarists." In this combination, which does not exclude strong rivalry, the *Zaibatsu* are far from being the army's pawns. Since 1940 they have defeated the military hands down on every issue of war-time economic control, to the advantage of their swollen profits. Yet a letter in *The Nation* for June 16 shows Eugene Dooman, Grew's trusted adviser, indoctrinating military-government trainees with the notion that the *Zaibatsu* will prove our "friends," through whom it will be expedient to "control" Japan's post-war economy. Under Grew's program they will remain in the Japanese government, which they have dominated for two decades.

In the light of these facts, consider Wilfrid Fleisher's words: "However much we may be opposed to monopolies and cartels, we cannot undertake to revamp Japan's business structure. This is an internal matter for the Japanese to handle in their own way. . . . There is at present no substitute for the business magnates." If the State Department is already determined to "use" the *Zaibatsu*, as it intends to "use" the Emperor, how can the Japanese people be expected "to handle in their own way" this "internal matter"? Incidentally, Fleisher devotes a page to the miserable condition of the farmers but does not once employ the word "landlord." Evidently the landlords will also be our friends in the State Department's post-war Japan.

The constitution of 1889 is another joker in the pack the diplomats are using to prepare a "peace" settlement with Japan. Imbedded in this constitution, especially in the preamble, is the God-Emperor concept which provides the "holy mission" for the "master race." The State Department school insists on the need for "reform" of this constitution. Wilfrid Fleisher devotes a whole chapter to a long list of needed "reforms," concluding with the suggestion that we "use" the Emperor to secure the changes desired, since only he has the power, under the 1889 constitution, to lay amendments before the Diet.

In this formulation of the issue a wild deuce has been added to the joker. No list of reforms, however long, ever mentions the preamble or Article 1 of the constitution, in which the Emperor's divine status is posited. For the State Department, as for the Japanese oligarchy, these provisions are sacrosanct. Moreover, the grave dangers of continuing this gift-of-the-Emperor constitution, fortified by "use" of the Emperor to amend it, are blandly ignored. This policy, clearly, is of a piece with all the rest. The Japanese people will never be able to build a democratic society on the foundation of a God-Emperor's "gift" constitution or with such a constitution be able to stop their rulers from launching predatory wars. Grew himself may be called as a witness. He once wrote: "So long as the constitution fixed sovereignty in the Emperor, it was impossible for any party to come forward with the doctrine that sovereignty resided in the people." The corollary would seem obvious. A new constitution, framed by elected representatives and based on the popular will, is needed to give democracy a chance in Japan.

For purposes of argument the State Department school affects great pessimism about the prospects of democracy in Japan. The people have had so little experience with democratic reforms, the feudal background is so close, the parties have been so corrupt, and so on *ad infinitum*. In point of fact, the conditions for a drastic social upheaval in Japan have long been present. Under conditions of defeat the tensions between landlord and landless peasant in the countryside, combined with the unrest of city workers, which has been expressed in great strikes even during the war, will almost certainly unleash a strong popular movement against the oligarchy. The reelection to the Diet in 1942 of the veteran anti-militarist Yukio Ozaki, despite attacks by the powerful military clique, testifies to the strength of the popular opposition to the groups which rule Japan. If our political warfare, controlled by the State Department, were to use the means available to fan the embers of unrest, a revolutionary uprising might shorten the war by months.

For all their pessimistic depreciation of democratic potentialities in Japan, the State Department and its followers are not unaware of the true situation. How else explain Grew's fear of a "disintegrating community of over 70,000,000 people," or Fleisher's outright assumption that "there will be chaos in the country"? The issue thus narrows down to a choice between support for the war-breeding Japanese oligarchy or encouragement of a popular revolt that will reshape Japan's outmoded feudal system on a democratic pattern.

On this question the State Department's program is unequivocal. It is determined to choose the members of Japan's post-war regime from representatives of the oligarchy, excluding only the "militarists." It intends to keep them in power in the name of "order." Does this mean that American soldiers will be used to crush popular revolts? If so, our military forces will be destroying the hope of creating a democratic Japan which can live at peace with its neighbors in the post-war world.

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The Zaibatsu as War-Makers

BY LAURENCE E. SALISBURY

FOR many decades Japan has been ruled by a coalition of four groups—the military, the bureaucrats, the politicians, and the *Zaibatsu,* or big industrialists and financiers. However much one group may maneuver against the other three to improve its own position, all are united in one aim: to increase their power over their own people and in the world at large through policies of expansion—if necessary through military force. Today, with military means failing, we may expect a reversion to peaceful means designed to insure the four groups' continued control of Japan in the post-war world.

The *Zaibatsu* will take the lead in the peaceful approach. The Japanese leaders are aware that in the democratic countries there are powerful political and financial interests which fear the elimination even in an enemy country of the class which corresponds roughly to their own. Such elimination would make way for the rise of vigorous elements discontented with the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few and might impair in some degree the power of industry and finance in democratic countries.

Prior to the Restoration of 1868 Japan was a feudal country, with the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant existing for the welfare and comfort of the warrior (*samurai*) class. The warrior class numbered perhaps a half-million in a population of some thirty millions. After the Restoration—feudalism came formally to an end in 1871—the small group of former *samurai* in control of affairs, aided by a few rich merchants, gave little thought to the welfare of the common people, but devoted their energies to making Japan militarily strong enough to meet possible dangers from abroad. To impress Western nations and to allay internal discontent the ruling groups gave Japan the trappings of a constitutional monarchy but kept the actual power for themselves through such devices as the constitution of 1889, the corruption and intimidation of political parties, and legislation which permitted the imprisonment of malcontents. The *Zaibatsu* are the descendants of the rich merchants who in this period intermarried with the nobility or were themselves ennobled.

Many members of the *Zaibatsu* have been educated in Western universities. They speak the language of their associates in the democracies. They seem to be solid, able men with the "know-how" needed in international finance, men who could further the rapid rebuilding of a defeated country on a pattern to insure comparatively early resumption of that mutually beneficial association with big concerns abroad which existed before Pearl Harbor. The *Zaibatsu* will stand no nonsense from the intellectuals, the little business men, or the little leaders of the Japanese people who may strive to emerge after the war. In short, the *Zaibatsu* will reimpose pre-war conditions in Japan.

This description of the *Zaibatsu* though accurate is incomplete. It fails to show how the policies of the *Zaibatsu* helped to bring on the present war and would endanger any future peace. In the first place, the *Zaibatsu* kept both urban workers and farmers economically so depressed that they proved to be a fertile field for the propaganda of Japan's leaders that world conquest was the country's destiny. Secondly, by depriving the lesser business interests and organized labor of effective political representation, the *Zaibatsu* throttled opposition to their own plans and those of the military. Thirdly, the *Zaibatsu* actively and consciously prepared the way for military aggression by making commercial and financial considerations subsidiary to those of military power in their business operations throughout East Asia. The successes of the Japanese military in the China and Pacific wars owed much to the activities of the *Zaibatsu.*

In the corridors of Washington one hears the theory that there are two kinds of *Zaibatsu*—the militaristic *Zaibatsu* who worked with the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and the good old families like the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi, whose members are in many ways like us—*nice* people. Unfortunately the theory is false. One cannot separate the *Zaibatsu* from the military, the bureaucrats, or the politicians. The four groups are inextricably bound together, not only by their intention to retain power and to expand territorially but by financial and economic interests, by intermarriage, and by a tradition of compromise and cooperation coexistent with acute business rivalry. They are also united by fear of the people whom they exploit, the impoverished Japanese millions.

It was not until the "enlightened" twenties that social legislation of any importance found its way into the statute books of Japan. This progress was not due to a change of heart on the part of the ruling groups but to such factors as the post-war boom, which made Japanese labor somewhat more articulate, and the influx of Western humanitarian ideas, which augmented the rulers' fear of socialism. The rice riots of 1918 showed the rulers the potential strength of the people.

In 1920, for the first time, the welfare of the people became sufficiently important for a Bureau of Social Affairs to be set up within the Ministry of Home Affairs. For the next ten years, that is, until the situation was altered radically by the Kwantung Army's seizure of Manchuria, this bureau proposed considerable legislation intended to improve the condition of the people. But at every turn elements of the *Zaibatsu* staunchly opposed any reduction of their profits or their power. Exploitation of the people continued both in the factory and on the farm. Some of the legislation passed reads extremely well, but it was only partially enforced.

It was the Japanese military, ironically enough, and not the *Zaibatsu* or their close associates, the big landlords, that awakened belatedly to the necessity of improving the condition of the people. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japa-

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nese War in 1937 the military leaders became acutely aware that the poor health of the recruits for the army and of the men and women in factories was hampering the prosecution of the war. The military were not motivated by humanitarianism but by the cold logic that underfed and diseased people make poor cannon fodder and incompetent factory workers. So in 1938 the Social Affairs Bureau was elevated to the status of a ministry, the Welfare Ministry. As in the 1920's, a spate of social legislation was now proposed. But it came too late to aid the people. The war with China dragged on, and the Pacific War approached. The military could not allocate funds to implement social legislation without sacrificing funds needed for the more visible sinews of war. After Pearl Harbor such social legislation as did exist was largely thrown into the discard because of the "greatest crisis in Japan's history."

Had the *Zaibatsu* been willing to limit their inordinate ambitions, the people might have had enough money to buy more than a little rice and fish and have become healthy and contented. This would have had two results: (1) the expansionists who led Japan into the war would not have found the people so ready to follow because of their empty bellies; and (2) the *Zaibatsu* would not have been so in need of new markets—there would have been a market at home.

Americans who say that the *Zaibatsu* were unwilling victims of the military ignore their eagerness to acquire new and exclusive markets and their paramountcy within the ruling coalition of the four groups. Two years prior to the seizure of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army, a comparatively enlightened and able Premier, Hamaguchi, attempted to carry out financial and economic policies which would have made military expansion less necessary in the eyes of the Japanese. Important elements among the *Zaibatsu* sabotaged his efforts. It is probably true that some of them were at first apprehensive about the aggression in Manchuria, but when they saw that the Western powers were not going to take action, they devoted their efforts to directing the expansion along sounder economic lines than the military unaided could evolve and to exploiting the victories of the military. Their ruthlessness toward their own people increased. For example, trade unions were suppressed in 1940; the elimination of the little business man and the small factory worker was accelerated; and the farmer was further oppressed by enforced enrolment in "cooperatives" and other measures.

The *Zaibatsu* did not object to war: they objected to policies which would impair their power and reduce their profits. In every important conflict behind the scenes between the military and the *Zaibatsu* the latter either won their point

HAPHAZARD ENTERPRISE FOR PRIVATE PROFIT ?
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT FOR THE COMMON GOOD
Politics for the Child-minds
BOO! GESTAPO!
ARE TORIES HUMAN ?
WILL LASKI BLOW UP PARLIAMENT ?
MY NEST-EGG RIGHT OR WRONG
"TOTALITARIAN" TOSH
IS CHURCHILL PRETTIER THAN ATTLEE ?

ON THE HIGHER LEVEL

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or effected a satisfactory compromise. Frequently the *Zaibatsu* gained the victory through an alliance with high military officers who had become sufficiently "moderate" to realize that cooperation with the *Zaibatsu* would enable them to pursue aggression more effectively. In recent years an increasing number of army and navy officers have joined the great industrial concerns, an indication that the policy of mutual accommodation continues.

Consistently the *Zaibatsu* have increased their strength. In the agencies which were established during the five years prior to Pearl Harbor as part of the movement toward a controlled economy, virtually all leading posts were allotted to business men. In 1940 a group of bureaucrats, with military support, advanced a plan—originating with Naoki Hoshino—to reorganize industry so that control would be wrested from the *Zaibatsu*. The *Zaibatsu* succeeded in emasculating the plan: the Minister of Commerce felt impelled to announce that the government had never thought of separating capital from management, and the author of the plan was shortly afterward dropped from the Cabinet. Again, during 1942 and 1943 when the Japanese leaders realized that the tide of war had turned against them, the *Zaibatsu* were successful in modifying Premier Tojo's effort to obtain virtually dictatorial powers over the war economy. Tojo found it necessary to create a Council of Cabinet Advisers consisting of seven leading men of the *Zaibatsu;* and in February, 1943, it was reported that he denied any intention of placing the country's chief industries under state control. Similarly, when the Munitions Ministry was established in 1943, the strength of the *Zaibatsu* was so great that they obtained great advantages in return for abiding by certain rules. In fact, after Pearl Harbor the *Zaibatsu* enjoyed an unparalleled boom: they enlarged their plants, launched new enterprises, and obtained phenomenal increases of capitalization.

Ever since 1931, when the current program of expansion began, there has been abundant evidence that the *Zaibatsu* not only have failed to oppose military aggression but have directed that aggression to their own profit, have employed the resulting situation to enhance their power within the coalition, and have used their enlarged control further to oppress the people, not only in order to augment their own wealth and power but to render the people impotent to challenge that power even in the empire's defeat. Under conditions of defeat, the *Zaibatsu* will prepare for the next war if given the opportunity.

Conscription or Enlistment?

BY MILITARIS

PRESIDENT TRUMAN, with the support of his Cabinet, has asked Congress to pass legislation now for compulsory military conscription in peace time. It is a dangerous request. Decision on such an important matter should not be taken without the fullest public discussion, and it would be grossly unfair, not to say undemocratic, to rush the thing through without giving the present members of the armed forces a chance to join in the discussion—at home, where they can hear and be heard. Nothing in the present situation calls for such haste.

Moreover, the discussion to date has not been notably realistic. With slogans ringing in our ears, we tend to overlook the fact that conscription is an old institution, with a history that might afford us some light. France inaugurated conscription in 1793, Austria in 1805, Prussia in 1808, Russia in 1864, Japan in 1873, and Italy in 1875. On the record, it cannot be said that conscription either created or destroyed the republican character of the French government or the autocratic character of the Russian or Austrian. Conscription, then, is neither democratic nor anti-democratic by nature, and arguments for or against it on grounds of political theory have no relevance. The record is equally impartial as regards the danger of war. Conscription has not secured peace for the countries that have adopted it, nor has its absence prevented England and the United States from engaging in numerous wars, offensive as well as defensive. And finally, there is no historical evidence that conscription guarantees victory or that its absence insures defeat.

The current proponents of conscription in the United States have two favorite arguments, unrelated but usually coupled: (1) it will improve the health, character, education, and patriotism of the conscript, thus performing the functions of social-service agencies; (2) in a world not yet at peace, and in the absence of a foolproof collective security organization, conscription is a military necessity.

The social-service argument is almost unbelievably thoughtless. It assumes (1) that the home, school, church, synagogue, club, union, and community have not made and cannot make Johnny and Janie healthy, intelligent, honest, and patriotic, and (2) that the armed forces can and will do these things. It is of course true that our present civilian social services leave much to be desired; but the armed forces are peculiarly unfitted to replace them. If 20.9 per cent of the rejections in the present war were for dental defects—to cite one well-known example—the answer is adequate food and dental care from childhood on. A year of military service would hardly be a substitute. Nor is it likely that educational and moral deficiencies of eighteen years' standing would be remedied. The army is not a school or a health resort; certainly it is not an ancient Greek ephebeum.

The purpose of military training is to produce efficient killers, not gentlemen or scholars or social-minded democrats. Whatever training is given to the conscript, be it physical, vocational, or moral, is conditioned by one supreme and abiding military motive: to kill the enemy. It could be truthfully argued that certain physical and educational improvements do accrue to the conscript, but the army has always frankly avowed that they are merely incidental to the basic

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job of acquiring proficiency in the art of killing. It could be truthfully argued that some character-building values inhere in being a member of a disciplined collectivity; the esprit de corps of a battle-seasoned group is high, and their civilian prejudices tend to dissolve under common danger—this extends even to Negro-white relations on the battlefield. But this sort of thing doesn't happen in the training camps, because it isn't allowed to happen. The armed forces have never claimed to be social pioneers. They haven't the time, the knowledge, or the will.

And even the incidental benefits are largely canceled out by the evils that go with military life. There is a fierce attack on the individual personality to make it fit the common mold of group discipline; there is a large gap between theory and practice in the fields of education and orientation. The removal of home and community restraints tempts many eighteen-year-olds into premature experiments, under bad conditions, with sex and alcohol. And it cannot be argued that the armed forces offer the best teachers, or even qualified teachers, in the field of democratic education. There is a wide gulf between officers and men—a gulf not warranted by the demands of discipline and representing primarily a survival of the military caste tradition. Segregation even extends to separate toilets for officers and men.

All in all, there appears to be little basis in fact for the idea that the armed forces are the best *institution* to give eighteen-year-olds health, education, and character development. This conclusion does not invalidate the idea that "a year of service to the country" would be a good thing. But there are many services and many agencies.

The argument that conscription is necessary for national defense stands on much firmer ground. To reject compulsory military service as a possible course of action, without full consideration, is to seek escape from a world not yet at peace and not yet practiced in the ways of peace regardless of good intentions. We cannot at this stage rule out the possibility of war. Only a world fully committed to economic and political cooperation can hope to have enduring peace. To this end we devoutly work. Meanwhile, conscription for defense is a legitimate issue for debate.

National defense, however, involves much more than military conscription. To consider this one resource in isolation from all others is unrealistic. Germany has demonstrated that no matter how powerful a nation may be it cannot overcome the military strength of a combination of enemies. No nation can defend itself alone against all comers; national defense for America cannot be divorced from participation in an international security organization.

The quantity and character of men and matériel needed for defense-by-helping-to-keep-the-peace are not precisely determinable, but we do know that the United Nations could provide a sufficient combined force without requiring a tremendous contribution from each nation. The commitment will probably entail a comparatively small but highly trained and highly mobile ground force, a two-ocean navy and merchant marine, and an independent air force. Since no one nation can ever attain a "defense" greater than all the others combined, the purely national defense units of the respective countries can be scaled down. Skill and mobility, not size, will be important.

In the light of this conception of national defense—and none other is valid except on the premise that we must prepare now for another world war—should we have universal military conscription? Would it assure us an adequate armed force? Probably not. A gunner on a Liberator or Flying Fortress today gets three months of basic training, three months of gunnery instruction, and three months of combat training before he goes on his first mission. Every other member of the crew—pilot, navigator, bombardier, engineer, and radioman—needs additional months of training. Altogether, the crew of a B-24 or a B-17 needs fourteen or fifteen months of preparation—*intensive* preparation. No peace-time air force would willingly accept the grueling schedule imposed on these men in the last phase of their war-time training. The process would almost inevitably be slowed down by 30 to 40 per cent. In short, one year of conscription would not be enough to train a bomber crew; and even if it were, the crew would have to be retrained within two years or be hopelessly out of date. The techniques of modern warfare change so rapidly that continuous training is essential. In an emergency it would do no good to call up airmen trained two years previously. And what is true of the air forces is more or less true of every branch of the services. For the most part, conscription would be good only for the sort of elementary training that can be acquired in a Boy Scout troop or a high-school R. O. T. C.

If, then, conscription is ineffective to produce adequate national defense, what are the alternatives? Surely we don't want to revert to the pre-war standards of voluntary enlistment, which made the uniform of the United States Army a social stigma except for officers. The only proper alternative is to raise the standards and increase the rewards sufficiently to assure an adequate professional army. I shall not argue the merits of the following proposed incentives, but I am sure most G. I.'s would approve them.

1. Promises as to training and assignment, except in the event of war, should be rigorously kept. There should be adequate aptitude and other tests before induction, on the basis of which the recruit should be given an assignment for which he is fitted or, if unfit for military service, he should be returned to civilian life. The air forces eventually saved a great deal of time and expense by testing candidates *before* sending them to training schools.

2. The minimum period of enlistment should be three years, for training and assignment will take almost that long.

3. Rates of pay for all enlisted men, particularly for the lower grades, should be considerably improved. At present rates it is impossible for married men below the grade of staff sergeant to live on army pay unless their wives work. This curtails their ability to have children, which is bad not only for the individuals concerned but for the nation.

4. Adequate housing and commissary, on or near military reservations, for all personnel, both married and single.

5. Real training and supervision of cooks. The possibility of abolishing K. P.—except as punishment—should be investigated. Civilian personnel should be employed here, as they are in PX cafeterias.

6. Standardization of promotion practices. Arbitrary freezing "in grade" reduces incentive. The experience of the Civil Service could be a useful guide here.

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7. Direct commissions should be available for men with special skills, but generally the practice of sending good men to officer-candidate schools should be maintained.

8. Replacement of the caste system with true discipline. Good officers, like good teachers, good foremen, or good employers, have no trouble in enforcing discipline. They receive a personal loyalty from the men which no artificial distinctions can replace.

With these incentives, it should be possible to build a real citizen army. The military caste system would be modified, and the old stereotypes of the "drunken sailor" and "the bad boy who ran away to join the army" would tend to disappear. The armed forces would be elevated to a new and better place in our national life, partly because they would contribute to the national well-being and partly because they would fulfil the legitimate needs of the individual.

Conscription can only encourage the worst aspects of a necessarily hierarchical system; voluntary enlistment under enlightened conditions can make the armed forces a calling to which free men in a democratic society will gladly dedicate themselves. Surely the cause of preserving peace in the world is worthy of such dedication.

Bill Mauldin's War

BY KING GORDON

I HEAR you have just left the army, Bill Mauldin, after putting in five years, collecting about a hundred service points—I don't know how many medals—and reaching the mature age of twenty-three. I've been looking at your cartoons for quite a time now and have come to the conclusion that you have done about as well as anybody could to give the folks back home an idea of what life "up front" is like. It's not easy to get the idea across to those of us who have put in a pretty safe and comfortable war over here. As you yourself say, "I guess you have to go through it to understand its horrors. You can't understand it by reading newspapers or by looking at pictures or by going to newsreels. You have to smell and feel it all around you until you can't imagine what it used to be like when you walked on a sidewalk or tossed clubs into horse-chestnut trees or fished for perch or when you did anything at all without a pack, a rifle and a bunch of grenades."

"That can't be no combat man. He's lookin' fer a fight."

So it's not easy for a civilian to write in praise or blame of a book* that comes right out of an experience in which he has no share. Probably I wouldn't have let out a peep had it not been for a review in last week's *Nation*. Now *The Nation* is scrupulous about respecting the independence of reviewers, but in this case it seems to me that another opinion is worth recording. I hadn't read your book when I saw the review, but I knew that whatever else your book might be it was not "dedicated to the proposition that war is funny." Because I never saw a cartoon of yours that didn't hit me closer to the midriff than to the funnybone. I couldn't judge, then, about your being "illiterate"; I would have been surprised to discover you were or that you had "bad taste." Without reading a word of the text I was prepared to bet that it was a pretty dignified and perceptive job and that if you did not quite have Ernie Pyle's flair for words, you and he probably talked—and understood—the same language.

Well, I read your book last night and my hunch was right. If I were you I wouldn't worry too much about literary style or grammar or standards of taste. You've given us a picture of the combat soldier in this war that will stick for a long time, and in about twenty-five years some wizened old ex-infantryman who spent the early '40's in northern Italy will pick up your book and say: "Yes, it was like that."

I was right too about you and Ernie Pyle. Your craft is

* "Up Front." By Bill Mauldin. Henry Holt. $3.

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drawing and his was writing, but your minds worked the same away. Remember he talked about "that stare" in the eyes of a soldier who has seen a lot of action, "a look of dulness, eyes that look without seeing, eyes that see without conveying any image to the mind. It's a look that is the display room for what lies behind it—exhaustion, lack of sleep, fear beyond fear, misery to the point of numbness, a look of surpassing indifference to anything anybody can do." You put it this way: "Look into an infantryman's eyes and you can tell how much war he has seen. . . . If he is weary and resigned to the fact that he is probably going to die before it is over, and if he has a deep, almost hopeless desire to go home and forget it all, if he looks with dull, almost uncomprehending eyes at a fresh-faced kid who is talking of the joys of battle and killing Germans, then he comes from the same infantry as Joe and Willie."

The humor of your book is a very special kind. It is humor that comes out of the mud and misery and boredom and fear of death that is modern war. It is a humor that asserts the ultimate bravery of the human spirit faced with unending distress and anguish. Frequently it is sardonic, sometimes it is impertinent (there were a good many brass hats who didn't appreciate you), almost always it is compassionate. It is never slapstick, never forced, never insensitive. Sometimes it simply states the wonderment and relief at being alive in the context of death. Sometimes the point is lost on the civilian through his sheer inability to identify himself with a front-line situation. Occasionally you stumble on a made-to-order formula, as in the case of the motorized cavalryman shooting his wounded jeep. But usually the humor comes naturally out of the experiences of your two weary dogfaces, Joe and Willie.

Most of your readers will understand what you mean when you say, "Since I'm a cartoonist maybe I can be funny after the war, but nobody who has seen this war can be cute about it when it is going on." There was nothing very funny in your description of the men staying for days and weeks in the wet foxholes in Italy and contracting trench foot. "If they couldn't stand the pain they crawled out of their holes and stumbled and crawled (they couldn't walk) down the mountain until they reached the aid station. Their shoes were cut off and their feet swelled like balloons. Sometimes the feet had to be amputated. But most often the men had to make their agonized way back up the mountain and crawl into their holes again because there were no replacements and the line had to be held." Most of your readers will get what you mean when you speak of the "certain nobility and dignity in combat soldiers and medical-aid men with dirt in their ears."

You've done a lot in throwing across a bridge—and there are all too few bridges—between the combat soldier and the civilian. Those who read your book are not going to frown heavily and escape responsibility by talking of the "problem of the returning veteran." Instead, they are going to think of a young American who has been away for a while doing a different kind of job and leading a different kind of life that has produced certain important changes in the way he looks at things. As you say, "If he is lucky, his memories of those sharp, bitter days will fade over the years into a hazy recollection of a period that was filled with homesickness and horror and dread and monotony, occasionally lifted and lighted by the gentle, humorous, and sometimes downright funny things that always go along with misery." You've helped us understand the man that's coming back from up front. It's probably going to be harder for him to understand us who stayed put at home sweating over our income taxes and Victory gardens.

Anyway, thanks for your book. And good luck to you.

In the Wind

THE TRIAL OF LORD HAW HAW in London drew forth this editorial comment from the Los Angeles *Herald Express* on June 20: "His trial is being watched with interest, particularly by Americans, for there are in this country many persons who are living on the borderline of treason. Jap lovers who want California again infested with wild, brute-animal Japanese are among these. Communists who love Russia more than the United States are another group. People of any race who use radio and women's clubs or other mediums of propaganda to overthrow the American Way of Life for foreign ideologies are another. . . . They should get the same kind of mercy from this country that Lord Haw Haw is going to get from Great Britain."

UNDER THE OPA-WPB low-cost clothing program, manufacturers are required to pre-ticket certain garments with their ceiling prices. The tickets are there, but in many cases they are hard to find. Sometimes they are hidden under the size labels, and sometimes they are sewn inside a seam in such a way that the customer must turn the garment inside out in order to see them.

THE NEW YORK *DAILY MIRROR* (Hearst) devoted its editorial on July 3 to the Nation Associates' dinner for Thomas Mann. It seems the affair was part of a plot to make the United States join Russia in a war against England.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT will release 10,000 light and 20,000 medium trucks for sale to farmers.

REVERSE LEND-LEASE from France in the year after the Normandy invasion amounted to $400,000,000.

AT THE ANNUAL commencement day luncheon of the University of California Alumni Association, June 23, the guests brought their own lunches. A good time was had by all.

HEADLINE in the Santa Monica, California, *Evening Outlook* for June 12: "RACKETEERS PLAN TO MILCH PUBLIC—Better Business Bureau Leads in Campaign."

LEGISLATIVE MEMO: H. R. 776, which would make it possible for Filipinos to become American citizens, has been passed by the House and is now in the Senate Committee on Immigration, headed by Walter Franklin George of Georgia.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. We will pay $1 for each item accepted*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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AMG Fumbles the Ball

BY PHILIP JORDAN

Kitzbühl, Austria, June 19

A CURIOUS but by no means inexplicable dichotomy is manifest today in the minds of both Bavarians and Austrians. (I write only of Bavaria and American-occupied Austria, since these are the two regions I have been able to observe.) They resent with much overt bitterness the Allied Military Government's retention of former active members of the Nazi Party in positions of authority; and, simultaneously, they are beginning to wonder whether perhaps they were not better off under the rule of the Nazis before their two countries were defeated and unconditionally surrendered. It is particularly distressing to find this hankering for a discredited regime, whose sudden ruin overwhelmingly disillusioned them, among sections of the population where it had never been truly popular.

An examination of the causes of this unwholesome state of mind discloses that much is lacking in the conception, as opposed to the execution, of Allied military government; the disclosure is the more disturbing in that it shows how "higher levels"—who will ultimately, one assumes, be responsible for the peace—have refused to learn anything from the mistakes they made when they set up military governments, first in North Africa and subsequently in Italy. Or else, of course, it shows a light-minded obstinacy happily rare in the annals of democratic government.

Let it be said at once—and all that follows must be read in this context—that, with a few neurotic exceptions, the personnel charged with Allied administration are doing conscientious and honorable work in exceedingly difficult conditions. Their business is to govern conquered enemy territory; but since no real policy, other than the brutally stupid policy of non-fraternization, has ever been formulated for their guidance, the areas under their control are necessarily ruled by capricious and empirical methods, varying from day to day and even from hour to hour. No over-all line of conduct exists to guide them: a string of negatives circumscribes the opportunities for setting a bewildered people a democratic example, with the natural result that each small area, in some cases each hamlet or village, is governed along lines totally different from those followed in neighboring communities.

AMG officials, many of them unable to speak a word of German, are frequently more bewildered by the problems that face them than are the people over whom they have been appointed to rule. In the resulting chaos Nazi officials may be retained in power simply because their knowledge of local conditions and of administration at least insures that the wheels of community life will continue to turn, albeit at a much-reduced speed. Such Nazi officials inevitably obstruct the efforts of Military Government officers to discover men of administrative ability who have not been corrupted by contact with the party.

Were it not for the policy of those responsible for psychological warfare, it would be a simple matter to discover this talent, to test its good-will, and at the same time to show these people how the workings of democracy can better their rapidly worsening lot. But, alas, psychological warfare is in the hands of one Brigadier General Robert McClure, in whom those who know him can have neither confidence nor hope. It was he who headed the reactionary censorship department installed in Algiers when the Allies first landed in North Africa; it was he who prevented correspondents there, infinitely better informed than himself, from stating that there was no need either to use Darlan or to employ the servants of the Vichy regime, since a fund of administrative ability friendly to our cause was available to us at any moment we cared to employ it. It was he who daily described as "highly inflammable" any dispatch which ventured to suppose that the appointment of Darlan was not the wisest move made since the war began. Sources of friendly aid also exist here, but because General McClure's old-fashioned ideas still prevail, they are difficult to find. All that his methods have achieved is to drive the people of these two areas, at least, to listen to the Berlin radio in preference to the drivel which comes nightly from the BBC and Luxembourg, and, by the prohibition of local newspapers produced by local people, to prevent AMG officials from discovering what the people under their control are thinking.

If we were anxious to discover what people are thinking, the way to achieve our object would be to allow them publicly to say what they think. If they were allowed to produce newspapers or to enjoy the right of free assembly—always under the possible veto of the local AMG of course—we should very shortly find out who was thinking what and be able to judge in some degree the qualities of various citizens who might be useful both to us and to their fellow-countrymen. Above all, perhaps, by granting such privileges we should have offered an example of the democratic principle in operation at a moment when it would be most persuasive.

In some communities here 90 per cent of former Nazi officials are still employed; and because some of the young men appointed to govern are losing heart, it is possible that these Nazis will continue in power for a long time to come. In other localities, where more imaginative or more optimistic governors have been appointed, there has been a change; and the mental health of the community has noticeably improved.

In the little town of Strobl, not far from Salzburg, a young American captain with nothing to lose—and that is important—has performed a wonderful piece of work. An ardent anti-Nazi himself, he first dismissed the Nazi mayor and deputy mayor. His difficulty was then to discover replacements for these men, and he solved it in a manner that has impressed his "pupils in democracy" with the efficacy of the American doctrine.

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He called in a dozen of the "city fathers" and astonished them by saying that as it was their community over which he was temporarily ruling, it would be for them and their fellow-citizens to nominate and then to elect a mayor and deputy mayor. He would set only one condition: no Nazis were to be nominated; but in the elections the Nazis were to be allowed to vote. They above all, he went on to explain, needed to learn what voting meant. The next day 60 per cent of the town's adult population turned out to present their nominations, and the six men with the most supporters were chosen to run in the election. A week later the ballot boxes were set up, each guarded by an American soldier to see that the votes were not falsified, and 70 per cent of the town came out to register their wishes. Despite original official disapproval of this exhibition of common sense, the process is now admitted to have been a success, but it has not been recommended elsewhere.

Strobl, alas, is an exception to the rule. In most places the AMG is no more than machinery for forbidding people to take action rather than for guiding them toward more healthful political methods than any they have known for many years.

Life in most communities is at a wholly unnecessary standstill, and food is growing short. Food was bound to grow short, and can grow a lot shorter before the people are down to the standard of Britain, let alone France, Holland, and Belgium. But the shortage, combined with that inertia which lack of policy has made inevitable, is causing many people to wonder whether they would not prefer the Nazis. However oppressive and uncivilized the Nazis may have been, there was some purpose in life, some organic direction, and you knew where you were going. The rule of non-fraternization is not teaching what democracy means; indeed, its impact on the population is hardly easier to bear than the former arrogance of the Nazis. How, indeed, *is* democracy to be taught to these people if none of its elementary decencies are manifested?

Downing Street and the White House have much to answer for in their conduct of our political warfare since September, 1939. Their lack of vision is now plainly revealed here in southern Germany and in Austria. "High-level" officials, "policy-making" officials, have had six years to think out a plan for Germany, and all they have produced is non-fraternization and a total black-out on our way of life—except for a few pompous platitudes uttered over the radio, to which the defeated can listen only with great difficulty. Small wonder that they are beginning to want to believe what Berlin and Vienna stations tell them; those stations offer them hope, however spurious it may be.

In the American Zone

There was a sound of revelry bei Nacht
For Ribbentrop and Kesselring and Schacht.
Herr Ribbentrop, a connoisseur of wine,
Declared the drinks were only fit for swine.
Reporters called his manners into question,
But Robert Murphy noted the suggestion.

J. M. M.

Censors or Reporters?

BY DONALD DOWNES

Milan, June 21

IT IS fashionable now to blame America's ignorance of what goes on in Europe on the military censors, but it is possible that American correspondents are also guilty of doing some pretty superficial reporting. Many hot spots of Europe which may cause another war and send another generation of Americans to Europe to die are not well covered in the American press. One of these is Italy.

The current *Stars and Stripes* carries a story which Leigh White of the Chicago *Daily News* sent home from Milan on June 18. In it Mr. White compares Lieutenant Colonel Hershenson to Major Joppolo of John Hersey's "A Bell for Adano," and says, "But it was not a church bell that was wanted by the people of Milan; it was something far more complicated—namely, a workable system of rapid justice capable of punishing the more important of local Fascists without degenerating into anarchy or civil war." The *Stars and Stripes* adds, "White says that Colonel Hershenson created orderly courts, paid every Italian patriot according to a specific scale of benefits, and started an investigation of prisoners taken by the partisans." White says further, "The purge of Fascists is being carried out by the Milanese themselves with a minimum of Anglo-American supervision. *Everybody, even the most radical of Partisans, now agrees that justice is being done in a fair and impartial manner*" (italics mine).

This Mr. White wrote on a day when thousands of North Italians were picketing with indignant banners the offices of the AMG in Milan, Genoa, Turin, and other cities because one Basile, who had ordered more than six hundred patriots shot and had procured forcibly for export to Germany more than six thousand Italian slave laborers, received a prison sentence instead of death. And on a day—June 17—when the Italian press of Milan carried four stories of men either pardoned by the Allied-supported royal family or given sentences considered too light by an overwhelming majority of the press and the public alike.

Mr. White credits Colonel Hershenson with the new Extraordinary Assize Courts. In point of fact these courts were established by decree of the Italian government at Rome on April 22 and accepted by Admiral Ellery Stone, U. S. N. R., for the Allied Commission. On all sides one hears criticism of these courts from Italians of all parties because the Bonomi government and the Allied Commission prefabricated them before the liberation in such a way as to leave very great influence to the judiciary which held office under Mussolini.

Mr. White also credits Colonel Hershenson with the fact that the street cars and public utilities run. They never stopped running. I arrived here on April 30, the fifth day of the anti-Fascist revolution, and ahead of the Fourth Corps, and I found all utilities and local transportation operating normally, traffic policed, and the central military command of the partisans in complete control. This was so because Ferruccio Parri and his associates had planned and executed a partisan movement against the Germans combined with a revolution against Fascism with such precision and force that there were few open hostilities and no damage to the neces-

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sary utilities or the factories—not because the AMG and the Fourth Corps were preparing to enter the city.

Colonel Hershenson is in every sense "a good guy" and has succeeded for the most part in giving the Milanesi a good government with a minimum of interference in small local matters, so far as the directives from on high, the Allied Commission at Rome, and Allied Forces Headquarters at Caserta, would allow. But to say that the AMG for Milan or for Lombardy, the latter under Colonel Charles Poletti, pleases "everybody," or even a majority of the Italians, or even the Americans themselves is misleading.

For instance: on June 8 the newspapers here received an order from PWB dictated from "on high" threatening them with suspension if they used news sources other than the United Nations News Service (predigested and selected by PWB), the BBC, or an American program relayed from London called "The Voice of America." One editor had a copy of Mussolini's orders muzzling the press, and the similarity to ours was frightening. "How," he asked me, "can we establish a democracy without freedom of the press?"

Today again the paper carries stories of wrist-slapping sentences against Fascists. Our canned news service has failed to give out a story of paramount interest to Italians—namely, that two such important Americans as Sumner Welles and Walter Lippmann think our policy toward Italy, and toward England in regard to Italy, needs radical revision. The AMG continues to ignore the black market. The wealthy industrialists who backed Mussolini and made millions out of Fascism continue at liberty to make eyes at British and American big business. The armistice terms are still a frightening secret, and Italian initiative is paralyzed by uncertainty about the future. Prince Umberto remains in power. And Italian disillusionment with our brand of democracy mounts daily.

But the good people of Chicago—and New York and hamlets beyond and between—continue to read either nothing about Italy or a report like Mr. White's that all is well because Anglo-American Major Joppolos are everywhere dispensing sweetness, light, justice, and democracy.

This is because political news, *peace* news, is being reported by *war* correspondents who flit by plane from here to yon, being an expert on Syria today, on Italy yesterday, and on Norway tomorrow. They live in comfortable hotels supplied by the army and see few "natives" except officials who dare not talk. Their reports are based on the wishful handouts of the public-relations sections of various army commands. They have neither the time nor the inclination to dig locally for the sad facts which might reveal that we are expending American prestige wholesale and reaping suspicion and distrust by making a fetish of order as opposed to revolutionary justice and by backing reaction against liberalism.

The American people are charged with decisions on foreign policy which will determine whether another generation must fight and die in Europe. World War III may come upon us while the readers of the Chicago *Daily News* and thousands of other papers are congratulating themselves on what a wonderful job we have done in democratizing Europe—in the opinion of reporters who may have written excellent stories about how bravely John Doe of 1313 Main Street, Oshkosh, Michigan, behaved at Cassino but who are wholly out of touch with the disillusioned peoples of Europe.

Attack from the Left

[The letter from which we take the following excerpts was written to an American friend by a young Frenchman who escaped from France in 1942, joined the Fighting French, and is now convalescing from tuberculosis brought on by the hardships he suffered.]

I'VE sent you another letter in which I do nothing but speak of personal things, so this letter shall be mainly about the situation in France. It's very simple: the resistance, lacking political experience, has not lived up to the hopes of the "alive" section of France and of our foreign friends that it would guide the regeneration of the country. The trusts, far more versed in these matters, have it, for the moment, in the palm of their hand. Practically in its entirety the resistance was and still is left. The question before the resistance then was not to know what political ideology to pursue but to know what methods to use in order to make its ideology prevail after the liberation. It is there that the resistants, honest, idealistic men but like many idealists naive, committed their gravest error. They believed that platonic suggestion would be sufficient to resolve the problem "amicably." They thought that because they were heroes they had only to speak and they would be listened to, and a new France, in their mold, would arise. "The others" let them talk, loaded their arms with flowers, and then maneuvered and jockeyed until now the resistants are sidetracked. They will go down in the history books, but they're not "to stick their noses into serious affairs." . . .

Among the resistants the Christian Democrats are largely responsible for the calamitous tactic of conciliation. The Christian Democrats deserve respect; they furnished the resistance movement with an important contingent of fighters and martyrs. But as far as domestic policies are concerned, they are swimming in a sea of rose water. Their idea is to transform society by transforming men. They think that all they need do is preach sermons to the bosses, and bad bosses will become good bosses and everybody will love everybody else. Perhaps in the next three thousand years the bosses may begin to listen to them, but have we the right to make starving people wait three thousand years? The Catholics are illogical, for in foreign affairs the theologians admit the legitimacy of force when no other way is left. Why not admit it in domestic affairs? Christ didn't preach homilies to the "sixty families" of the Temple—he drove them out with a whip. Today it would be a machine-gun.

Perhaps you may ask: You tell me that the resistance has been shunted to one side, but isn't it true that a large number of resistants are now in the government? Yes, that's true. But the resistants chosen have not been always the most talented, and many are men who came back from London and from Algiers. Most of these resistants in office have been selected from among the people of the right or of middle-class origin. There were, it must be said, many bourgeois in the resistance. They were honest and courageous. But a bourgeois reasons, just the same, like a bourgeois. With the best will and intentions in the world, unless he has a special kind of genius, a sort of atavism molds his views. . . .

Anyway, as I've said, the fight has merely been postponed.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

THE GREAT RETURN

Some day ten million Ithacas will have them;
They will come steaming home, come banking home
Past the big cloud the god of our suspense
Built high above sweet springs and shingled houses.
Some day, some day, the oceans and the air,
Man loud, will bear them hither in slow swarms—
Slow, but a host will gather, and long shores
Live with familiar feet, and inland acres
Shudder beneath fond weight, and cars and cattle
Caper again; the factories, the highways,
Fields, and old hedges musical with raincrows,
Parlors, and potato-scented kitchens,
Be as ten million nests for homing men.
Who as they nod and settle will remember
Others that never flew—the jungle holds them,
And the exploded abbey, the shrill street
Where snipers are no more; nor comrades either.
Sweet is the land that death too once desired,
Sweet the acknowledged waters, the roof ridges
That faded in a far dream or did not—
Not now, except for these who are the world's
Forever as they halfway too come home.

MARK VAN DOREN

IS "FREEDOM ROAD" TRUE?

BY COLEMAN ROSENBERGER

THE literary quarterly *Sewanee Review,* recently rejuvenated under the editorship of Allen Tate, has attacked the historical accuracy of Howard Fast's novel "Freedom Road." But more, Fast is pictured as the leader of a "cult" which has as its purpose the deliberate distortion of Southern history. In a review of twenty-one current novels *Sewanee* finds that "nine bear the taint." The "members of this cult," runs the *Sewanee* argument, are "anti-historical propagandists" and "prophets of a new past, the past being overhauled to meet the specifications of some immediate political pressure." The area of their activity has included the "liberal" weekly (the quotation marks are *Sewanee's*), and "the most disturbing achievement of this cult, if its influence shall continue, will be an actual past fanatically destroyed and replaced by a 'scholarly' past existing only in the fictions of research."

What is the truth of this? I suspect that what is really agitating the intellectual apologists for the Old South is that for the first time their interpretation of history is being challenged and subjected to a searching reevaluation.

Sewanee notes with satisfaction that "the world of serious scholarship" has not been "invaded" by "propagandists" like Fast, and regrets that "sober Southern historians" are being ignored. Let us, then, call a "sober Southern historian" to witness. A recently published volume, which has been all too little noticed, casts much light upon Reconstruction history. It is the careful, 500-page biography of Senator Benjamin R. Tillman by Francis Butler Simkins, "Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian," published by the Louisiana State University Press in 1944. The author was born in the same county in South Carolina as was the subject of his biography, so he would hardly be, as *Sewanee* charges of Fast, "guilty of the elementary ignorance of not knowing that South Carolina is a part of the Deep South."

Simkins's book includes a chapter, The Campaign of 1876, which describes the young Tillman's "yeoman service in the struggle to rid South Carolina of Negro and Carpetbag rule." It is a completely documented account, which, I think, will be very difficult to explain away. It is much to the point of the questions raised about the authenticity of "Freedom Road."

What does the South Carolinian Simkins say about the campaign of 1876? Tillman and his neighbors decided upon "the use of intimidation and fraud as the only means of forcing the blacks back into subordination." They "felt no compunction in applying lawless tactics to the political situation." Under the command of a former Confederate officer, Tillman and nearly half a hundred of his fellows developed what became known as "the Straightout, the Shotgun, or the Edgefield policy." The enemy was the freed slave. Simkins quotes Tillman's statement of the strategy: they "agreed on the policy of terrorizing the Negroes at the first opportunity, by letting them provoke trouble and then having the whites demonstrate their superiority by killing as many of them as was justifiable."

Incidents were not long in coming. The house of one of the white citizens was burned. Although, in Tillman's words, only "circumstantial evidence and suspicions" pointed to any Negro as the incendiary, a warrant was issued for the arrest of a Negro leader. When he was not found at his home, the members of the white military company were made a *posse comitatus* which hunted through the countryside for ex-slaves.

In the summer of 1876 an "opportunity for bloodshed" was provided at the town of Hamburg, which may or may not have a resemblance to Fast's Carwell, but which Simkins describes as "a once prosperous town which had degenerated into a refuge for Negro criminals and politicians." A trial was called after a disturbance when two white men in a buggy forced their way through the town. Tillman is quoted: "It was our purpose to attend the trial to see that the young man had protection and, if any opportunity offered, to provoke a row, and if one did not offer, we were to make one."

The description of the "Hamburg massacre" which followed may best be read in Simkins's book. It may be noted that after a number of prisoners were taken it was asked "whether the lives of only two blacks should pay for the death of one white. The answer was an emphatic negative."

Simkins observes of Tillman: "That the entire North as well as liberal Southern circles condemned the so-called

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Hamburg massacre caused him no heartaches; he was contemptuous of such opinions. As he neared home that morning, he stopped at a neighbor's house and ate heartily of watermelon; he felt elated."

The feeble attempt of the state government to bring the rioters to trial on charges of conspiracy and murder was met with "defiance and derision." Simkins notes that "there were no judicial authorities in South Carolina with the temerity to reckon with Ben Tillman and his neighbors."

With its local success, the Edgefield policy became the model for the rest of South Carolina. Two of the Edgefield leaders captured the state democratic convention and engineered the nomination of Wade Hampton as Governor. The "Red Shirts" were organized to put the Edgefield "Straightout" on a state-wide basis. In one of the first clashes several former slaves were killed in a swamp, and Simon Coker, a mulatto state senator accused of making a "very incendiary speech," was executed.

Two months later Hampton became Governor.

This, very briefly, is part of the story which a "sober Southern historian" has to tell. His book is the result of long and thorough historical research. It deserves consideration in judging the historical "distortions" of such a novel as "Freedom Road."

Polemic Against Fatalism

FATE AND FREEDOM, A PHILOSOPHY FOR FREE AMERICANS. By Jerome Frank. Simon and Schuster. $3.

WHEN a lawyer, judge, and former chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission writes a book on the philosophy of history, every impartial reader will admire and respect the intellectual versatility which makes such an achievement possible. Frank's previous books have dealt with social and political themes and have marked him as a student who transcended his specific legal discipline. In his latest volume he goes even farther afield and essays a treatise on one of the most vexing problems of historical interpretation—the relation of human freedom to the casual sequences and "trends" of history.

Frank's interest in this problem is not academic. He believes that modern culture has been too much inclined to determinism and fatalism and that this tendency contains a threat to a democratic culture. He therefore marshals every possible resource of his wide erudition and imaginative mind to counter the influence of what he calls "inevitablism" and to establish the thesis that a healthy democratic culture requires confidence in the reality of human freedom and responsibility.

Few would quarrel with the main burden of the thesis, though it may be questioned whether it is possible to carry it through as unqualifiedly as Judge Frank attempts. In his polemic against "inevitablism" he not only challenges historical determinism but adduces all possible evidence against the concept of causality in the physical sciences, bringing indeterminism in the physical world to the support of a pure voluntarism in the interpretation of history.

In this unqualified defense of voluntarism, the paradoxical relation of freedom to fate is not fully comprehended. Mr. Frank admits, for instance, that "both Freudians and Marxists paradoxically aim to alter the inevitability which they proclaim to exist." That is equally true of older determinists, such as Moslems and Calvinists. The determinists are, in other words, not so consistently deterministic as they pretend and as Mr. Frank assumes. They assert human responsibility even while they seem to deny it. Mr. Frank is quite right in insisting that they violate logic in doing so; but the important point is that their system of thought may do more justice to the fact of human responsibility than his polemic against them implies.

On the other hand, Mr. Frank is forced to qualify the rigor of his indeterminism and voluntarism. He makes his reservation in his introduction but unfortunately fails to elaborate its full implication. He declares:

> Much is said in this book about the impossibility of accurate history writing. The reader, noting that I have engaged in considerable historical discussion, may feel that I have refused to take my own medicine. The answer is that, unlike most professional historians, I frankly acknowledge that my versions of history are "just-so stories." Indeed, my fundamental thesis is that all human interpretations of experience are "just-so stories," some of which are more desirable, or plausible, or useful than others.

The words "plausible, desirable, or useful" are weasel words which leave one in the dark whether or not Judge Frank desires to escape pure relativism. If the words imply that some stories are more truthful than others, there must be criteria of truth; and history cannot be a chaos of pure contingency from which no significant concepts of meaning can be derived. If the words do not imply "truthfulness," there is no reason why anyone should read the "just-so stories" of anyone else.

The issue between determinism and voluntarism, in short, is not so clear-cut as Judge Frank assumes. Determinists make concessions to the fact of human freedom and responsibility; and voluntarists, such as Frank, must make their concessions too, or they will reduce the realm of historical events to such a chaos of contingency that nothing can be said about it.

The undue rigor of the thesis of the book does not, however, invalidate many wise and searching observations upon the central theme. The pretensions of the historical sciences to scientific exactness are nicely debunked. In dealing with the relativism of all historical judgments, the contingent character of historical events is perhaps unduly emphasized, and the relative perspective of the historical observer, as a source of the relativity of judgments, is not fully dealt with. But the problem is illumined from a wide field of learning.

One very confusing element in Frank's treatise is his belief that historical determinism is somehow or other related to asceticism. I have read and reread the chapter entitled Our Ascetic-Fatalistic Science in an effort to understand the connection between asceticism and fatalism, but it still eludes me. Judge Frank writes:

> The makers of modern physics were (to use the modern jargon) sublimating the fierce ascetic drive that formed the central part of their social heritage. It was easy for men steeped in Platonism and in the gospel of St. Augustine to make a scientific gospel of Democritus's ascetic-deterministic doctrine.

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Judge Frank rightly regards the determinism of the eighteenth-century physiocrats as the root of many modern social illusions which prevent us from dealing adequately with the problem of poverty and justice. He admits that this kind of determinism is part of a commercial civilization which reacted strongly against medieval asceticism, "liberating greed and making it a virtue, indeed the highest virtue." So the relation between determinism and asceticism remains a mystery.

Yet this book is a book to be read for both instruction and enjoyment, even if the central thesis cannot be accepted unqualifiedly.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Caruso

ENRICO CARUSO, HIS LIFE AND DEATH. By Dorothy Caruso. Simon and Schuster, $2.75.

IF CARUSO were alive today he would be seventy-two years old. He died in 1921, at the age of forty-eight, the greatest singer of his own and perhaps of all time. To the people who were fortunate enough to hear him from the stage, he remains, after all these years, a unique recollection; but even for those of us who know his voice only from recording, it is a still-present wonder. Part of the wonder is its extraordinary range and power; much more of the wonder is, I think, its emotional quality. It is a quality in response to which our usual class protections and vulnerabilities seem miraculously to disappear. Whether we are opera lovers or scorners, whether we look upon singing as the noblest or the least noble of the arts or as no art at all, when Caruso sings, the discriminations and prejudices bred of education no longer obtain; only Caruso obtains. I doubt that there has ever been an art performance more widely shared and more unanimously received. At once the most personal of artists, who would seem to sing to each listener alone, and the most impersonal of artists, who refuses to be made the property of any social or aesthetic coterie, Caruso is an occasion for that sense of community with our fellow-men which has been set down as a purpose of art but which art in actuality seldom aims for and even more seldom achieves.

I suppose it is an expectable irony that the man who could dispel our loneliness was himself a very lonely man, a frightened and finally a tragic man: the lives of artists constantly teach us this pattern by which the artist's unhealthiness becomes our health, his suffering our pleasure. Yet as it uncovers the background of pain to a performance that gave the appearance of being, above all things, easy and "natural," Dorothy Caruso's account of the three years of her marriage —they were the last three years of Caruso's life—is almost unbearably newly poignant; and perhaps it is always so; perhaps the suffering of any individual artist is always without precedent. In Caruso's case there was, first, the anguish simply of being a singer—of having as one's instrument one's own body, so that added to the not uncommon anxieties for the flesh, there was the uncommon invitation to identify flesh and art. There was the anguish of being the *greatest* singer: how terrible it must be to live with an awareness of being the greatest anything! There was the anguish of being a public person—the usual threats and invasions, the destroying emotions of not daring to trust. At last, there was the anguish of



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MACMILLAN

the long sick prelude to death, the coming to terms with the annihilation of all of self and power.

Although Mrs. Caruso's memoir supplies personal details about Caruso—his tastes, his relations with family and friends and servants, his program of work—for which we have a boundless curiosity, in the long run what she tells us about her husband is much less interesting than what she lets him tell about himself, through the letters he wrote on tour. (Herself, Dorothy Caruso is a character conceived by Edith Wharton and given moral stature by Henry James; she would seem to have been born only for Caruso's need of her.) Caruso's letters to his Doro are written in what must be a quite precise transliteration of his Italian American speech. They reveal no slightest trace of the consciousness of possible posthumous publication. They ring with a directness of statement which I doubt has been equaled in the correspondence of any public figure. Caruso complains of the difficulty of translating his feelings to paper, but here too the performance is deceptively easy; and after all, how small was this effort of art compared to the effort of translating his feelings into music. The weirdly spelled words, the strange and beautiful locutions, "pour out" on to paper just as the Caruso voice poured out into air.

Of course there is always this mistake about singing: because it is an art of the body, it is taken to be mindless, a primitive art without thought or discipline. And similarly Caruso's personality, so demonstrative of emotion and apparently so little of the head, is a temptation to oversimplification: he is a peasant with God-given vocal cords, he is "all wop" with a voice. But could the letters be so heartbreaking except for their constant interplay between the simple man and the complex artist? Here, for instance, is Caruso himself to contradict any false assumptions about the nature of the singer's art; from Havana he is writing about a performance of "Carmen": "But where I made everybody crazy was at fourth act, the big duet, I do not know myself where I find all this power of voice and drammaticity. I think this came from my brains in which is the motto, 'Before you will kill me, I will kill you,' and, for consequence, I put all my soul in what I do." It is a primitive formulation, it you will, of the sublimative process, of art's desperate offensive-defensive. But that anyone can be called a primitive person who is able to forge such a statement, I very much question.

Indeed, my own sense of Caruso's personality, from his letters, is of a primitive nature upon which the gigantic endowment of gift gradually thrust large responsibilities of maturity and wit and wisdom, then the responsibilities themselves created or found in Caruso the necessary maturity and wit and wisdom. The letters which are so plentiful, for instance, in neurotic—that is, symbolic—fears, are also plentiful in proofs of Caruso's capacity to cope with the world; the pointedness of his social protests is always in exquisite contrast with the "emotionated" tone of his personal protests. Thus, the same letter which begins, "Then, sweetheart, you cry on my letter? Wy? Have I the power with my bed englisch to let you cry? I dont want that your beautiful eyes cry . . ." can continue, "At 2 p.m. we went outside of the town for lunch. There was Mr Trepiedi who invited us, but this man must be called 'Onepiedi', because he is short of intelligence. He say that the lunch will be 'en famille' but there

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was many people of the Italian colony, beginning from the Ministre. That was nothing. The dinner was fine. At the end Mr Trepiedi come up and make speek and say, 'I must thank Commendatore Caruso and the Ministre for the honor which they had to come to my house.' I was making a sketch [one of his caricatures, which were so remarkable] and I heard what he says, and with laughing, I sad, 'Here, here! The honor is yours.' Everybody laughing. He sad, 'Excuse me, I have a little cognac in my head and made mistake.' It very funny until here. But he continue and invited me to remember that the Italian colony is poor, and ask if I will sing for the poor. This was the point of the lunch. I stopped to sketch and told few words in thanking, and let remark that it was not necessaire to give me such a Lucullian dinner which was better to give to the poors, and showing himself to be charitable. But all this was telling with laughing, but the concret was that I dont need a lunch to make a charity. I dont know how the presents took my words but there was a silence like when the people make a 'gaf.' "

Or here is the Italian peasant who may know sorrow but no confusion, when he is confronted with the sophistications of Southampton internationalism. A summer charity fair has been arranged, and Caruso is the chief attraction; he has offered to do his caricatures at ten dollars each, and a lady of fashion leads him to his booth, decorated with red, green, and white streamers, two Italian flags, and thick fringes of dry spaghetti. Mrs. Caruso reports the quick blankness of Caruso's face. "I am sorry, Madame," he says, "but I cannot make my drawings in there. Please have the spaghetti taken down." And he adds with a smile, "Spaghetti, you know, is for the kitchen and I am not yet hungry." It is on the way home that he comments sadly to his wife, "They do not imagine such things will offend because many people think of Italians only like that. What surprise me is that such nice people make such mistake."

Nice people? And yet, perhaps they were nice people—for the moment, at least, in which Caruso needed to see them so. There is always the artist's uncharted perception of the decencies; and there is also his taste for aristocracy, his need—often quite open—of a superior social class with which he can make some fraction of common cause—enough, at any rate, to account for his own superiority. The changeling fantasy belongs to all children, but it belongs especially to artist-children; and the youngest of a big, undistinguished family, Caruso explained his distinction by the fact that he was nursed by a Countess, whose own baby had died. Perhaps the fantasy helped him carry the burden of his uniqueness.

Certainly one has the impression that at the age at which we meet him, the burden has become—deep down within him—unendurable; when he becomes ill and allows himself to be given such bad medical treatment, the suspicion is bound to occur to us that his choice of doctors is not wholly without some profound inner direction. Of course, in a quite literal sense, just as he paid for his art in anguish, he paid with his life for his art: there are the Italian specialists, for instance, who because they fear to take chances with so eminent a patient, let Caruso die. But before that there are the medical errors which Caruso himself permitted, even seemed to ask for—the doctors he suffered because he could not bear to hurt their feelings. When we recall that this is the man

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Men at Work

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who told someone to go home and brush his teeth because his odor was offensive, and put it together with Caruso's recurring "premonition" of death, we get a glimpse of what otherwise would seem only an excess of delicacy. The life-giving artist is also the man weary of life. The precarious balance between the two impulses is finally destroyed, and as Caruso dies, the story seems even to by-pass our usual notions of tragedy. We confront an elemental realm, where the idea of tragedy is too intellectual for what is happening: the mind turns to images of great noble animals and their long death throes, to the tremendous overwhelming of the force of life by its opposite. DIANA TRILLING

BRIEFER COMMENT

About the Russians

RICHARD E. LAUTERBACH'S "These Are the Russians" (Harper, $3) is a book by a foreign correspondent which can be warmly recommended. It is, to be sure, written in *Time* and *Life* style, and in its chapters on Stalin and such military leaders as Zhukov and Novikow it says little that has not been said before. Nor are the author's findings about the status of religion in the U. S. S. R. original. Mr. Lauterbach is not a student of revolutionary theory, and can be extraordinarily naive, as when he says, "The Russians like Tito. So do the British." There is much of this sort of thing. Like most correspondents he is convinced that Russia will collaborate with the rest of the world, on a basis of realistic security interests. What distinguishes the book is the author's energy. He gets around, he is persistent, even brash, with his questions, and usually they are the right questions. (He speaks Russian.) He has vitality and warmth; his interviews are convincing; he sees not merely the small but the large human realities. As a result there is a surprising amount of new information in the book, particularly about the reconstruction work now being done. RALPH BATES

Catholic Views on Race

TEN CATHOLIC SCHOLARS of various nationalities have contributed essays to "Race, Nation, Person: Social Aspects of the Race Problem," which is edited by Bishop Joseph W. Corrigan and G. Barry O'Toole (Barnes and Noble, $3.75). It is the second of two symposiums. The first dealt with the biological aspect of race. The present volume discusses race in the context of history, philosophy, ethics, jurisprudence, and politics. The prevailing point of view of the various contributors is indicated in the following sentences from a foreword by one of the editors: "The need of the hour is for an antidote to secularist thought, which by its denial of the personal dignity of man saps the foundation of American democracy, making for the triumph at home of the very totalitarianism we are fighting abroad." "It is only by returning to Christian personalism that America can hope to avoid state socialism, the despotic extreme to which reaction against the abuses of an unreasonably anti-social individualism will inevitably lead." Since the discussions of such problems as the relation of individuals and occupational groups to the state and to church and national cultures are based upon Catholic philosophy, the reader with a secular attitude toward such questions would naturally expect to find certain postulates which he could not accept. Even so, readers who place their trust in "secularist thought" may be surprised to find that in one of the essays John Dewey is accused, with the logical skill characteristic of such writers, of preaching an irrationalism which provides a philosophical justification for German racial theories. It would probably be futile to ask the author how, if one would avoid the unreality of scholastic thought, the universality and objectivity of truth can be established except through the generalization of empirical and pragmatic knowledge. Although this volume is based upon premises which are not compatible with secular science, some of the essays will appeal to persons with a modern scientific outlook. For example, the essay by Professor Joseph T. Delos, of the Catholic University of Lille, is a penetrating analysis of the individual's rights vis-à-vis the state and the race. E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

Democracy on the Job

MANY OBSERVERS have been distressed at the waste and inefficiency in the average office or shop resulting from the gulf between "management" and the "staff." Yet it has never been quite clear what the remedy was. Scientific management has too often been merely a polite word to cover up a speed-up or a reduction of staff, and labor unions have often only intensified the existing suspicion and strife. Stuart Chase shows us in "Men at Work" (Harcourt, Brace, $2) that modern industry can be made far more efficient—as well as more pleasant—if the workers are encouraged to participate as a team both in planning and operation. He cites a number of dramatic instances in which workers have banded together with management to achieve results not dreamed of under the old-fashioned autocratic management. In a word, democracy works as well in economic life as in political life—if we really give it a chance. MAXWELL S. STEWART

The Hancock Fortune

IT IS EASY TO DWELL on the many weaknesses of John Hancock; one of the better modern historians has referred to him as an "empty barrel." Yet his services to the Revolutionary cause were very real, though derived less from his ability than from his economic and social position. That position was a legacy from his uncle, Thomas Hancock. The methods by which the Hancock fortune was created are established in an exhaustive study by William T. Baxter, professor of accounting in the University of South Africa—"The House of Hancock; Business in Boston, 1724-1775" (Harvard University Press, $3.50).

This volume has important implications for the political historian, but its greatest value lies in the field of economic history. Too little economic history has been written, and too much of what has appeared has been inadequately done. Professor Baxter, a trained accountant, has skilfully analyzed the Hancocks' business records and made a distinctive contribution to our understanding of the business life and procedure of their time. RALPH ADAMS BROWN

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Return to India

THE EFFORT TO CHART a personal course through a complex situation is most rewarding when the environment is revealed by the reaction to it. Then the place as well as the person falls into focus, and insights of general interest emerge. That, happily, is the case with Santha Rama Rau, who at the age of sixteen returned to her native land, India, after ten years in England. Her story is told with the distinction that comes from honesty and unpretentiousness in "Home to India" (Harper, $2.50). It covers the years between 1939 and 1941. The slim volume has no statistics but is full of sense and sentiment. And it is one of the most useful aids I have seen to the understanding in human terms of an important segment of Indian life. Miss Rau was a foreigner at home. Her grandmother's rigorous Brahman code was strange to her. And equally unknown were the multitudes who slept on the Bombay streets, the upper set with its parties and tennis games, and the earnest workers for India's freedom, to whom prison terms were sometimes a goal, sometimes a casual excursion. And of course she found that some of the most ardent workers for a new India were, like her mother, members of the upper class. Either as observer or participant Miss Rau sought out all these groups and through them came to know India's varied life. Humor and an inquiring, discerning mind helped her to find her own bearings, which, like those of every truly well-balanced person, appear to have a slight imbalance. The result of it all was the decision to come to America to find out how a democracy really works so that the knowledge might later be applied to India. Another equally important result was a book that sheds genuine light on the surface of one of the most talked about yet least understood countries in the world.

VIRGINIA MISHNUN

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Music

B. H. HAGGIN

THE attitude I have been objecting to—the preoccupation not with the piece of music but with ideas about its style, period, and tendency—turns up in unexpected places. It isn't only the New Friends of Music audience that, instead of listening to a quartet of Haydn or Mozart, reads in its program-notes a history of chamber music by Dr. Curt Sachs, or a discussion of the style and tendency of the particular quartet (which is difficult to correlate with the details it refers to even when it has such real connection with the work). A museum which finds it possible to hang its pictures and simply let people look at them cannot do the same thing with music: it must have a musicologist to construct programs and write program-notes that will teach the audience about styles and developments (with results that I will soon get around to describing). And—most absurd of all—a record company which decides to reissue some outstanding recorded performances of jazz cannot offer them as something to be listened to and enjoyed; it must offer them as something to teach styles and developments, with the help of booklets containing the fantastic inventions, the confusions and obscurities, and the sheer illiteracies of the "authorities" in this field.

The latest instance of this is six albums of recordings of what Victor calls hot jazz that it has reissued for educational purposes. Jazz, says the Victor announcement, "has mainly been considered as pleasant listening, but of little serious value for the music student"; but "before hot jazz can be incorporated into serious American music, each giving to the other, there must come about a better understanding of jazz" by musicians and listeners; and it is to achieve this that Victor has reissued the performances with booklets by Charles Edward Smith. This "well known jazz authority" seems to have refrained tactfully from pointing out to Victor that hot jazz is nothing that can or will be incorporated into serious American music; or that not all of the performances reissued by Victor are hot jazz. Of those I have heard the Jelly-Roll Mortons (Set HJ-5; $2.50) are hot jazz, with vitality and good invention in the collective operation of the small groups. But the McKinney Cotton Pickers (Set HJ-4; $2.50) are large-band arrangements in a hot style that doesn't sound very hot today, and are quite dull. And the Louis Armstrongs (Set HJ-1; $2.50) are purely "commercial" affairs, with Armstrong vocals and exhibitionistic trumpeting against arranged gilt-and-plush large-band backgrounds. As for the notes on the performances, they go through the verbal motions of describing styles and developments which they actually don't describe at all.

Louis Armstrong's early career is documented by Decca's Armstrong album in its Brunswick Collectors' Series (Set B-1016; $3.50), containing "Terrible Blues" and "Santa Claus Blues," recorded by the Red Onion Jazz Babies, a Clarence Williams five-man group, in 1924; "Static Strut" and "Stomp Off, Let's Go," recorded by Erskine Tate's larger Vendome Orchestra in 1926; "Georgia Bo Bo" and "Drop That Sack" recorded in 1926 by Lil's Hot Shots, another name for the Hot Five that included Johnny Dodds and Kid Ory; and "Wild Man Blues" and "Melancholy," recorded in 1927 by Johnny Dodds's Black Bottom Stompers, with Earl Hines at the piano. I have found all but two uninteresting—the two exceptions being "Georgia Bo Bo" (80060), which is a good performance in simple Hot Five style; and "Wild Man Blues" (80059), which is one of the greatest jazz performances on records. In Armstrong's other Hot Seven "Wild Man Blues" (originally on Okeh 8474, later on Vocalion 3193) his trumpet solo is an uncontrolled and extravagant outpouring in comparison with the one in this Brunswick performance, in which the control and power one feels in the rhythmic and stylistic coherence of the extraordinary flow of invention are tremendous. Dodds's clarinet solo and Hines's support at the piano are also superb.

There is another attitude of the musicologists that turns up in jazz. They have a habit of establishing the original form of an art as the only legitimate form, of which the inevitable modifications and developments into new forms are sternly condemned as degenerations from the primitive *typus*. In the same way the original New Orleans style—produced by "cornet lead, and clarinet and trombone countermovements, over a two-beat rhythm section," as one reader described it to me—has been set up as the only authentic form of jazz, with much the same result: any departure from New Orleans style is not jazz, and all the different departures are equally terrible. The reader I have mentioned spoke of Chicago style as though it were as far from the truth as "powerhouse arrangements for 27 trumpets and 89 saxophones"; and for him the Louis Armstrong Hot Five played jazz, whereas the Armstrong-Hines-Robinson-Strong combination merely played *like* jazz.

This of course is all nonsense. Jazz could not stop with the New Orleans style; and among the departures and developments we have to distinguish those, like the Chicago style, that are jazz, from those, like the "powerhouse arrangements," that are not. Moreover we have to recognize value in whatever style it appears in—to recognize that the Armstrong "Wild Man Blues" in the Decca album is an incomparably greater jazz performance than the Hot Five "Georgia Bo Bo"; that the Chicago Rhythm Kings' "I've Found a New Baby" and "There'll Be Some Changes Made" are more exciting than the New Orleans style performances in Victor's Jelly-Roll Morton album.

And so, even though they did not originate in the brothels of New Orleans for which some of the jazz authorities have such a strong nostalgia, the following, on Commodore records, are excellent jazz performances: "Tin Roof Blues" and "Royal Garden Blues," with Davison on trumpet, Brunis on trombone, Schroeder at the piano (556; $1); "How Come You Do Me Like You Do" and "Struttin' With Some Barbecue," with Butterfield on trumpet, Wilbur de Paris on trombone, Bowman at the piano (561; $1); "Memphis Blues" and "Sweet Sue, Just You," with Spanier on cornet, Mole on trombone, Russell at his worst on clarinet, Schroeder at the piano (1519; $1.50). Also good is "St. Louis Blues," with Hackett on trumpet, Mole on trombone, and Russell doing his strangling act on clarinet (1518; $1.50), and with an unbearable "Peg o' My Heart" on the reverse side; and as good playing as I have heard from Teddy Wilson in recent years is in "Caravan" and "It's Only a Shanty," with some coarse-toned and spasmodic clarinet-playing by Edmond Hall (557; $1). Wilson also is exciting in the fast-paced Benny Goodman Sextet performance of "After You've Gone (Columbia 36781; $.50); but he is at his aridly tortuous and ornate worst in a dreary duet with Goodman in "Body and Soul" on the reverse side.

Mr. Agee, now on vacation, will resume his film column in the issue of July 28.

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Letters to the Editors

A Veteran Wires

Lyme, Conn., by Western Union

Have spent unhappy afternoon in country reading and rereading John Senior review of Bill Mauldin's magnificent book in current *Nation*. Review consists of three sentences by Senior and one quoted from Mauldin. Am I wrong in thinking that only the one from Mauldin makes sense? Mauldin in both cartoons and text says plainly that war is not funny but that there are occasions of grim humor to relieve the horror and boredom. Far from being "characteristically illiterate," the text is, in fact, artful and extremely accurate reporting of the way soldiers feel. Advise rushing one Ross dyspepsie tablet and/or stomach pump to Senior at. once.

CHARLES G. BOLTE

Full Employment Is Possible

Dear Sirs: Leo Barnes's article, The Anatomy of Full Employment, in your May 26 issue is doubtless as good an estimate of post-war employment prospects as can be made from a limited point of view. But to achieve a complete picture, anatomy must be supplemented by physiology. Mr. Barnes barely takes into account the organic functioning of our economy. There is no limit to employment outside of the economy itself —except the willingness of people to work. Mr. Barnes ignores this fact and tacitly assumes that the very best we can hope for in the post-war years is to provide as much employment in most lines as in our best pre-war years. Of course he does attempt the difficult job of estimating the effect of changes in public demand and of technological development, but he does not examine the factors which might either facilitate or retard the employment of everyone who wants to work, whatever the size of the labor force.

This, actually, is the most important aspect of the problem. The core of the matter is the utilization of income, which is itself derived from the productive process. Income can be used in ways which will support full employment or in ways which will produce unemployment. Mr. Barnes correctly assumes a continuing check to full employment in our economy on the basis of past performance. But he is probably wrong in tacitly assuming that this will also be true in the immediate post-war period.

In taking this position, I do not rely too heavily on the allegedly imminent consumer buying spree based on accumulated war-time savings. S. Morris Livingston's War-Time Savings and Post-War Markets in the September, 1943, *Survey of Current Business* and your June 9 editorial, The Threat of Deflation, discuss that problem realistically. What I do rely on is the great volume of investment opportunities created by reconversion to peace-time production and the application of all the technical advances made during the war. Morris Livingston and E. T. Weiler, in an article, Can Business Finance the Transition? in the February, 1944, *Survey of Current Business* estimate that in the aggregate business will have resources adequate not only to reconvert but to expand production. How great the outlet and need for investment may be in new industries, neither these authors nor any others, so far as I know, have attempted to estimate. Livingston and Weiler estimate maximum reconversion needs at 36 billion dollars. New industries and new facilities in plastics, electronics, and light metals will certainly add several billions, despite prospective bargain prices for government-owned plants.

For the first few years after the war at least, business capital expenditure offers a good prospect of supplementing direct consumer expenditure sufficiently to maintain substantially full employment. This conclusion does not, of course, take into account the inevitable transitional unemployment during reconversion. There are many pitfalls in the path toward full employment, and we may fall into them. But Mr. Barnes fails to consider the possibility that we may not fall into them. And if we don't, we may reach new high levels in both employment and national income within the next few years.

ROBERT D. PATTON

Galena, Ohio, July 2

The Austrian Riddle

Dear Sirs: Among those who have criticized my article on Austria in your May 26 issue are Socialists who feel that I dealt too unfavorably with them and Catholics who think that I commented too favorably on the writings of Ernst Fischer, the new Communist Minister of Education in Catholic Austria. I refer both these groups to the following passage about the Jesuits in Fischer's pamphlet "Der Oesterreichische Volks-Charakter" (London, Austria Center):

> Austria had become 90 per cent Protestant when it was changed back into a thoroughly Catholic country by the Counter-Reformation. The terror of the Counter-Reformation is known. Yet its victory cannot be explained by terror alone. Jesuit "propaganda," to use a modern word, played no small role. In the first place there were the Jesuit schools, which led the young people back to Catholicism and exerted a powerful influence on the most intelligent and gifted sons of both the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The Jesuit schools were far more attractive, many-sided, and consistent than anything that had yet existed in the field of education.

I would not dream of whitewashing the Jesuits and their reactionary tendencies, but we must also rid ourselves of the Greater German, anti-clerical legend which onesidedly glorified Protestantism and stigmatized the Jesuits as the essence of damnation. The Protestant Leibnitz admired the Jesuit schools, and sadly

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Crossword Puzzle No. 121

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 Famous artist's retort when asked what he mixed his paints with
5 Fancy describing an aircraft carrier as a teetotal flop!
10 It is not for chanting before meals (hyphen, 5-4)
11 Aptly put
12 Daughter of Ahab and Jezebel in Racine's tragedy of the same name
13 A singular species of bindweed
14 The festive board
16 They regarded bootleggers as legitimate prey (hyphen, 2-7)
18 League started by a typical German
20 Wife of Isaac—had her first child when she was ninety
22 Champagne for the buffoons? Er—Mumm's, perhaps
24 Not a gumboil, but a kind of molasses
26 Central African animal that goes around trying to look like a giraffe
27 By Sheraton, Chippendale or Hepplewhite, perhaps
28 They often bear traces of lipstick
29 A force of 200, *decimated* by enemy fire, has how many casualties?

DOWN

2 Insect or fish
3 Floating slab of frozen aqua pura
4 The mark perhaps of a churchman's crowning labor (two words, 6 & 3)
5 "Big ----- have little ----- upon their backs to bite 'em, and little ----- have lesser -----, and so ad infinitum"
6 I am a car (anag.)
7 Where the foot that speeded the parting guest was applied (three words, 2, 3 and 4)
8 Though engaged to both Lord Mountararat and Lord Tolloller, she was unhappy because she loved Strephon (*Iolanthe*)
9 Rooted to the spot with terror
15 How one would be judged destitute (three words, 2, 2 and 5)
17 He and his wife form a fine combination in domestic economy (two words, 4 and 5)
18 They finally made Socrates drink it
19 Kermit the Hermit
20 Wolsey was weary and old with it (*Henry VIII*)
21 "Nothing but a lot of quotations!" was Simple Susie's verdict on this Shakespearean play
23 Furnishings of a s.s.
25 Den, relatively speaking to some extent

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 120

ACROSS:—1 DESPAIR; 5 MINERVA; 9 NIGGARD; 10 SQUEERS; 11 EMS; 13 UNTRUE; 15 SERENE; 16 SCHOLAR; 17 NODS; 19 ERSE; 20 EXEMPLARY; 21 HOPE; 23 EDIT; 26 POLITIC; 28 ACUMEN; 29 NUNCIO; 30 STY; 32 DEPRIVE; 33 AUTOMAT; 34 DAYBEDS; 35 DRESSER.

DOWN:—1 DON JUAN; 2 SIGHTED; 3 ABACUS; 4 RYDE; 5 MOSS; 6 NEUTER; 7 ROE-DEER; 8 AUSTERE; 12 MOOT POINT; 14 ECHELON; 15 SALADIN; 18 SEE; 19 EYE; 21 HOARDED; 22 PAUL PRY; 24 DECAMPS; 25 TROTTER; 26 PETITE; 27 CUPTIE; 30 SETS; 31 YARD.

acknowledged that teachers were despised among the Protestants. The principle of Jesuit education was to adhere stubbornly to its goal in all decisive questions; but at the same time its methods were designed to meet the interests, needs, and peculiarities of its pupils. . . . The Jesuits utilized the arts, and primarily the theater, to the utmost in the service of their educational method. A strange double game of gaiety and danse macabre, . . . of liberty in small matters and obedience in great ones, characterized the pedagogy and thereby the theater of the Jesuits.

It may well be that this interpretation of Austrian Catholic history by a leading Austrian Communist intellectual will serve as a key to the many riddles that will be posed in Austria.

ERNST KARL WINTER

Tenafly, N. J. June 30

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